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THREE MAY NOT BE A CROWD: THE CASE FOR A 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PLURAL MARRIAGE 
Ronald C. Den Otter∗ 
ABSTRACT 
This Article takes seriously the substantive due process and equal 
protection arguments that support plural marriage (being able to marry more 
than one person at the same time). While numerous scholars have written 
about same-sex marriage, few of them have had much to say about marriages 
among three or more individuals. As progressive, successful, and important as 
the Marriage Equality Movement has been, it focuses on same-sex marriage at 
the expense of other possible kinds of marriages that may be equally 
worthwhile. The vast majority of Americans still do not discuss plural 
marriage openly and fairly, as if the topic were taboo. One of the goals of this 
Article is to convince readers that marriage in the future could be a much 
more diverse institution that does a better job of meeting individual needs. 
After all, one size may not fit all. Unfortunately, too often, scholars reduce 
plural marriage to the exploitation of women and the abuse of children. This 
approach makes it too easy to dismiss the possibility that a plural marriage 
might work better than the alternatives for at least some individuals in some 
circumstances.  
Because the expansion of marriage to include same-sex couples is bound to 
cover a broader range of marital relationships, lawmakers, judges, and the 
rest of us eventually will have to decide which kinds of intimate relationships 
will be accorded legal status and which kinds will be left out. Today, a 
growing number of Americans reject the double standard when a state does 
not treat same-sex couples the same as opposite-sex couples when it comes to 
eligibility for marriage licenses. The strong dignity language of the recent 
Windsor decision indicates that future courts will be more skeptical of the 
rationale for limiting marriage to a man and a woman if it is predicated upon 
demeaning sexual minorities. Another double standard, which is the focal 
 
 ∗ Ronald C. Den Otter, Associate Professor, Political Science, California Polytechnic State University, 
San Luis Obispo. J.D., University of Pennsylvania School of Law, 1992. Ph.D., UCLA, Political Science, 
2003. I would like to thank Sonu Bedi, Elizabeth Brake, Matt Moore, Mark Goldfeder, the editors at the Emory 
Law Journal, and my (only) wife, Grace Den Otter, for all of their help in making this Article possible. 
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point of this Article, concerns why the state allows almost all couples to marry 
for just about any personal reason that they happen to have. At the same time, 
all states continue to refuse to recognize any plural union. Those who care 
about gays and lesbians being discriminated against cannot ignore whether 
those who would marry multiple partners, if they were allowed to do so, are 
also being treated unfairly. The former kind of discrimination may be more 
widespread and worse than the latter, but that does not mean the latter is 
constitutionally permissible. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article is about the unconstitutionality of laws that limit civil marriage 
to couples.1 As of this writing, even though numerous legal scholars have 
contributed to the same-sex marriage debate, most legal scholars have been 
reticent about marital multiplicity.2 The Marriage Equality Movement has 
focused on same-sex marriage, and this focus, while understandable at this 
historical moment, has come at the expense of other forms of marriage that 
may be equally worthwhile. With about three-fourths of the states finally 
legally recognizing marriage between two men or two women, it is about time 
to contemplate the constitutional implications of requiring states to grant 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples.3 Anyone who endorses the view that 
government may not limit marriage to opposite-sex couples, either on 
substantive due process or equal protection grounds, must be curious about 
whether states may continue to prevent even fully informed, consenting adults 
from marrying more than one person at the same time. 
These days, it would be unusual to find a progressive that opposes any kind 
of unequal legal treatment of sexual minorities. Even some conservatives have 
seen the writing on the wall and have modified their positions accordingly.4 
That said, most legal scholars would not see plural marriage in the same light. 
As Eugene Volokh writes, “[I]t’s pretty clear that a state may choose not to 
 
 1 RONALD C. DEN OTTER, IN DEFENSE OF PLURAL MARRIAGE (forthcoming 2015). 
 2 However, there are some exceptions. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN 
DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 197–98 (2008) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY 
OF CONSCIENCE]; MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES 
APPROACH 229–30 (2000) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT]; RICHARD A. 
POSNER, SEX AND REASON 257–60 (1992); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1421–35 
(2d ed. 1988); Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 
29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277 (2004); Sanford Levinson, Thinking About Polygamy, 42 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 1049 (2005); Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2110 (2005).  
 3 As of April 30, 2015, same-sex marriage exists in thirty-seven states—Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, 
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Nevada, New Jersey, New 
York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, 
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming—and in the District of Columbia. Marriage 
Center, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/campaigns/marriage-center (last visited May 17, 2015); see 
also Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Decide Marriage Rights for Gay Couples Nationwide, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
16, 2015, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/17/us/supreme-court-to-decide-whether-gays-
nationwide-can-marry.html. 
 4 See Perry Bacon, Jr., Conservatives Increasingly Weary of Opposing Gay Marriage, NBC NEWS 
(June 20, 2014, 4:49 pm), http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/conservatives-increasingly-wary-
opposing-gay-marriage-n137046. 
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recognize polygamous marriages.”5 Additionally, many progressives remain 
reluctant to broach the plural marriage question, as if it were taboo. Their 
refusal to do so was more defensible at a time when opponents of same-sex 
marriage invoked the slippery slope to discredit such marriage by leading 
Americans to believe that the legal recognition of same-sex marriage would 
entail people’s marrying nonhuman animals and inanimate objects.6 The 
purpose of this Article is to induce readers to consider the possibility that the 
constitutional arguments against nonmonogamous marital alternatives are 
much weaker than they may appear to be. At the very least, their doing so 
would demand that they not boil down its wide variety of forms to the worst 
aspects of patriarchal polygyny found in some religious or cultural traditions. 
Antipolygamists have been allowed to frame what little debate there has been 
about the topic to make it seem that being open to the idea of plural marriage is 
the equivalent of endorsing the exploitation of women and the abuse of 
children.7 
The ongoing debate about same-sex marriage is not only about gay and 
lesbian couples and their constitutional right not to be discriminated against; it 
is also concerns the most appropriate legal definition of marriage in a country 
that has exhibited an unfortunate tendency to discriminate invidiously against 
different minorities. At stake is nothing less than discerning the meaning of the 
United States Constitution when those who have different ideas about marital 
relationships want the freedom to live unconventionally. In the last few years, 
the debate over how marriage should be defined has pushed a growing number 
of Americans to confront a problematic double standard in situations where a 
state refuses to accord same-sex couples the same constitutional right to 
marriage that their opposite-sex counterparts already may exercise. The strong 
dignity language of the recent Windsor decision, several lower courts’ 
subsequent interpretation of it, and the resulting scholarly discussion of the 
meaning of animus for constitutional purposes indicate that future judges could 
 
 5 Eugene Volokh, Crime to Conduct Same-Sex or Polygamous Marriage Ceremony?, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Jan. 14, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/14/crime-
to-conduct-same-sex-or-polygamous-marriage-ceremony/. 
 6 See, e.g., Dan Amira, Rand Paul Walks Back Suggestion that Gay Marriage Will Lead to Interspecies 
Marriage, N.Y. MAGAZINE (June 26, 2013, 4:54 p.m.), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/06/rand-
paul-gay-marriage-animal-human.html. 
 7 See, e.g., Shoshana Grossbard, Polygamy is Bad for Women, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE 
(Dec. 17, 2013, 6:39 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/12/17/should-plural-marriage-be-
legal/polygamy-is-bad-for-women. 
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be more skeptical of the reasoning behind restricting marriage to a man and a 
woman if such a restriction is predicated upon demeaning sexual minorities.8 
Another double standard, which is less visible yet equally disconcerting, 
involves why the state only allows couples to marry. Those who care about 
gays and lesbians being discriminated against cannot ignore whether those who 
would marry multiple partners, if they were allowed to do so, are also being 
treated impermissibly under the Constitution. The former kind of 
discrimination may be worse than the latter, but that is not the issue. As the 
debate over the meaning of marriage continues, those who oppose plural 
marriage can be expected to draw upon some of the arguments that 
traditionalists have deployed against marriage between people of the same 
gender. In articulating their normative constitutional view, they will have to do 
more than consult a dictionary, refer to religious understandings, conduct 
survey research, embrace “tradition,” investigate how most people happen to 
use the “m” word, put forth empirically unfounded claims, or generalize from 
outliers. In the face of this double standard, progressives could (1) change their 
minds and reject a constitutional right to same-sex marriage (or its equivalent 
on equal protection grounds) or (2) attempt to defend the constitutionality of 
unequal legal treatment of polygamists and polyamorists who would marry if 
they could. In the past, those who favored same-sex marriage hesitated to align 
themselves with those who advocated decriminalizing polygamy or legally 
recognizing plural marriages. Instead, they went out of their way to distinguish 
sharply between discrimination against gays and lesbians and discrimination 
against polygamists.9 
However, there must be a legally relevant difference between the two kinds 
of marriage or else the state must cease to privilege monogamous marriage. In 
2015, fewer Americans believe that states may put their stamp of approval on 
opposite-sex marriages to the detriment of same-sex ones to validate 
heterosexuality.10 As it turns out, some of the most compelling reasons that 
advocates of same-sex marriage offer in the name of such marriage also 
support the option of plural marriage. The slope from same-sex to plural 
marriage may be slipperier than they realize in the sense that some of the same 
reasons, like respecting marital choice and promoting equal treatment, which 
 
 8 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013). 
 9 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 280–
81 (1999). 
 10 See Justin McCarthy, Same-Sex Marriage Support Reaches New High at 55%, GALLUP (May 21, 
2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/169640/sex-marriage-support-reaches-new-high.aspx. 
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figure so prominently in defense of same-sex marriage, are equally applicable 
to being able to marry more than one person simultaneously. If progressives 
reject their constitutional equivalence, they must explain why the state may 
treat the two types of marriage differently without acting unconstitutionally. 
This explanation would aim at establishing that numerical limitations are 
justified in a way that those based on sexual orientation (or gender) are not. 
Not only have they failed to do so as of this writing, they almost always draw a 
bead on polygyny as if it were the only form that a plural marriage could 
possibly take. Those who concern themselves with treating everyone as fairly 
as possible should not be indifferent to other, more hidden manifestations of 
marital discrimination, particularly when a plural marriage could be same-sex, 
bisexual, or asexual. This Article argues that for constitutional purposes, the 
legal definition of marriage in each state must include the option of plural 
marriage. By not making marriage considerably more inclusive, without 
adequate justification, the state fails to accept the marital choices of all adults 
and treat them equally. As such, states that issue marriage licenses to couples 
also must give them to “plural marriage enthusiasts” so that they can form a 
multi-person marriage.11 
This Article shall be divided into the following Parts: (1) the first Part puts 
the topic of plural marriage into a legal context by clarifying the relevant 
terminology and articulating how the ongoing debate over same-sex marriage 
in this country relates to whether states only have to recognize monogamous 
marriages; (2) the second Part discusses reasonable concerns about how 
women are treated in polygynous relationships and distinguishes between two 
kinds of gender equality: internal (the interpersonal dynamics of the intimate 
relationship) and external (how the law treats the relationship) because 
standard critiques of plural marriage, which almost always target polygyny, 
conflate the two types; (3) the third Part spells out worries about child 
development in families with “thruples” or “moresomes,” explains why such 
worries are overstated, and suggests that parental multiplicity may be a 
superior parenting arrangement; (4) the fourth Part argues for the value of 
marital choice on substantive due process grounds by drawing on not only 
constitutional doctrine but also on well-known constitutional cases; (5) the 
fifth Part advances the view that equal protection requires states not to 
discriminate against plural marriage enthusiasts by denying them marriage 
licenses; and (6) the sixth Part summarizes the possible adverse consequences 
 
 11 Sonu Bedi refers to them as “plural marriage enthusiasts.” SONU BEDI, BEYOND RACE, SEX, AND 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION 236–44 (2013). 
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of judicial recognition of a constitutional right to plural marriage and 
elaborates on why fears about the judiciary’s moving the country in a 
particular normative direction usually are not as compelling as they seem to be. 
The Article concludes with some thoughts on why ordinary Americans may 
begin to discuss plural marriage with the kind of care that the topic deserves 
sooner rather than later. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Terminology 
Anthropologists tell us that “polygyny” is a man with multiple wives, 
“polyandry” is a woman with multiple husbands, and “group marriage” is any 
combination of three or more persons.12 “Polyamory” also covers multi-person 
intimate unions.13 “Polyfidelity” underscores how individual choice and 
equality could characterize such a relationship.14 I will use “polygamy” when 
more than two adults consider themselves to be a unit, are not legally married, 
and each of them is physically intimate with at least one of the other persons, 
to highlight the open sexual nonexclusivity that characterizes intimate 
relationships with multiple persons. Approximately 500,000 polygamous 
households exist in the United States.15 Fundamentalist Latter-day Saints 
(FLDS) polygamists comprise as many as 60,000 of them.16 Polygynous living 
arrangements appear in Muslim immigrant communities as well.17 The fallacy 
in equating plural marriage with FLDS polygyny (or any other variation, of 
which there are many) lies in the fact that such an action usually ends the 
conversation before it even has a chance to begin. In doing so, antipolygamists 
invoke memories of sociopathic cult figures and then make it almost 
impossible to take seriously the possibility that any multi-person relationship 
could be morally unobjectionable. Only a small number of FLDS practice 
polygyny.18 Polygyny is just one of the multiple forms of plural marriage, and 
 
 12 MIRIAM KOKTVEDGAARD ZEITZAN, POLYGAMY: A CROSS-CULTURAL ANALYSIS 3 (2008). 
 13 See DEBORAH ANAPOL, POLYAMORY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: LOVE AND INTIMACY WITH 
MULTIPLE PARTNERS (2010).  
 14 Maura I. Strassberg, The Challenge of Post-Modern Polygamy: Considering Polyamory, 31 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 439, 452 (2003). 
 15 SHERIF GIRGIS, RYAN T. ANDERSON & ROBERT P. GEORGE, WHAT IS MARRIAGE? MAN AND WOMAN: 
A DEFENSE 51 (2012). 
 16 ZEITZAN, supra note 12, at 89.  
 17 JANET BENNION, POLYGAMY IN PRIMETIME: MEDIA, GENDER, AND POLITICS IN MORMON 
FUNDAMENTALISM 7 (2012). 
 18 Id. 
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not all polygynous relationships are dysfunctional or involve crimes. Even if 
polygyny became more widespread and more states were to let people marry 
more than one person at the same time, the sky would not fall. 
FLDS polygynous “marriages” continue to serve as the archetype for plural 
marriage. To confine ourselves to that example is to impair our thinking about 
the forms that such marriage could take in a society that did not force such 
persons to conceal their unconventional intimate relationships. It is 
unreasonable to believe that the number of polygynous marriages would 
explode if women were suddenly allowed to marry a man who is already 
married, especially if they had more marital options, including nonsexual ones 
rooted in a close friendship or caretaking. The insinuation that all polygynous 
marriages are like those of Warren Jeffs or Winston Blackmore is more than a 
rhetoric cheap shot; it exploits prejudices against religious minorities and 
non-Western immigrant communities and fear of difference more generally. 
The typical FLDS polygynous “marriage” does not encourage other felonies.19 
When someone commits serious crimes, then of course he or she should be 
prosecuted, notwithstanding whether an intimate relationship contains more 
than two persons. The proper legislative response to problems that may arise 
more often in such situations is regulation, not prohibition. The status quo, 
where states permit polygynous cohabitation and criminalize polygynous 
“marriages” but rarely enforce laws against them is virtually incoherent. It is 
intelligible only if one cares about symbolism or wants to empower 
prosecutors to charge a defendant with additional crimes to improve their 
bargaining position during plea negotiations. 
Unfortunately, many critics of plural marriage have been allowed to argue 
from irrelevant extremes for such a long time. Their ability to get away with 
such a tactic has contributed to the popular belief that a plural marriage could 
not be loving or caring. Not only is this view demonstrably false, it seems to 
draw nourishment from the underlying but unwarranted belief that 
monogamous intimate relationships always are superior to their polygamous 
and polyamorous counterparts. This double standard has not been satisfactorily 
defended. Marriage does not have to be about sexual gratification or 
procreation; it also can contain many other sorts of intimacy that can be 
expressed in different ways. The participants of a plural marriage may find 
such a relationship to be more emotionally satisfying or more consistent with 
their conceptions of “the good life.” In a family environment that has multiple 
 
 19 Id. at xvi. 
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caregivers, a more efficient division of domestic labor, and greater financial 
stability, children, the elderly, and the disabled may be more likely to receive 
the care that they need. 
When referring to being married to more than one person simultaneously, 
this Article uses “plural marriage” to eschew the negative preconceptions 
associated with patriarchal polygyny. This term covers any legal status where 
at least three persons constitute a single marital unit, notwithstanding its 
configuration, gender composition, or interpersonal dynamics. For the 
purposes of this Article, then, polygamy is an intimate relationship among 
three or more adults that the state does not recognize as a marriage or its legal 
equivalent. The only difference between polygamy and a plural marriage is 
that the state recognizes the latter as a legal status. The definition of marriage 
that this Article claims to be constitutionally mandated would dramatically 
alter the current legal meaning of marriage by covering a much wider variety 
of intimate relationships. With this new definition of marriage in place, 
irrespective of their gender, two or more adult siblings or close friends could 
marry each (or one) another. Such marriage still could be reasonably regulated. 
To argue against numerical restrictions is not to argue against all restrictions, 
some of which may be valid. After all, no thoughtful person takes seriously the 
view that the legal recognition of different kinds of plural marriages would 
enable adults to marry children, animals, or inanimate objects, which are 
incapable of giving legal consent. 
B. The Double Standard 
At best, the topic of plural marriage is an afterthought in the ongoing 
debate about same-sex marriage. Most participants, who vocally advocate for 
same-sex marriage, assume that the Constitution does not protect the right to 
plural marriage (or its equivalent on equal protection grounds).20 Thus, they 
must distinguish same-sex marriage from plural marriage in defending a 
constitutional right to the former without proving too much and thereby 
unintentionally creating a right to the latter. When it comes to two-person 
marriage, opposite sex or same sex, the law never concerns itself with the 
personal reasons that a couple has for marrying as long as the marriage is not 
fraudulent for immigration purposes. With that exception, the personal reasons 
 
 20 See, e.g., Hema Chatlani, Article, In Defense of Marriage: Why Same-Sex Marriage Will Not Lead Us 
Down a Slippery Slope Toward the Legalization of Polygamy, 6 APPALACHIAN J.L. 101 (2006); Elizabeth 
Larcano, Note, A “Pink” Herring: The Prospect of Polygamy Following the Legalization of Same-Sex 
Marriage, 38 CONN. L. REV. 1065 (2006). 
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for a monogamous marriage are assumed to be good enough to justify legal 
recognition. By contrast, the personal reasons for a plural marriage are 
assumed to be so bad that they could not possibly be sufficient, even when one 
or both persons are fully informed about the nature and possible consequences 
of the legal relationship that they would like to form. Usually, this double 
standard escapes the scrutiny that it should receive. This state of affairs should 
not go unnoticed when so few people believe that the state may vet the 
personal reasons of couples applying for marriage licenses, no matter how 
silly, trivial, or idiotic they might be. Constitutionally, for couples, the 
meaning of marriage is left to competent adults who can decide for themselves 
what they want their marital relationship to be. 
Unless one dogmatically subscribes to the view that all monogamous 
marriages are better along all dimensions than all multi-person intimate 
relationships, little imagination is required to appreciate how a plural marriage 
could be happier, healthier, and more conducive to human flourishing. Not 
only is that view demonstrably false, it fails to account for the fact that 
different people have different ideas about intimacy and what is most 
important to them more generally. In the past, typical media coverage of plural 
marriage only involved law enforcement raids on polygynous compounds and 
stories of cultist behavior, exploitation, and abuse,21 leading most Americans to 
conclude that plural marriage can be reduced to other illegal or immoral 
behaviors. However, just because some polygamous relationships are 
polygynous does not mean that all of them are or would be in a different 
marital regime. And just because some of the polygynous relationships are 
dysfunctional or tainted by criminality does not mean that all of them are under 
all circumstances. If a state were to permit plural marriages, it still could 
continue to impose reasonable restrictions, like consent and age requirements, 
and prosecute people for crimes like forcible or statutory rape, underage 
marriage, incest (between an adult and a minor), intimate partner violence, 
child abuse or neglect, tax evasion, or welfare fraud. The relevant bases of 
comparison cannot be the worst forms of polygyny and ideal forms of 
monogamy. 
For the most part, Americans do not discuss plural marriage with the kind 
of sophistication that it calls for, but that state of affairs seems to be changing 
 
 21 See, e.g., Michelle Roberts & Paul J. Weber, Texas Ranger Says Raid of Warren Jeffs’ FLDS 
Compound Vindicated, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 11, 2011, available at http://www.deseretnews.com/article/ 
700170119/Texas-Ranger-says-raid-of-Warren-Jeffs-FLDS-compound-vindicated.html. 
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slowly but surely. In the future, marriage could be a much more diverse 
institution that more effectively meets individual needs. People are similar in 
some respects and different in other respects, and considerable variance is to be 
expected. Americans are becoming more accustomed to the possibility that it 
may not be inappropriate for people to have an unconventional, nonmarital 
intimate relationship when those involved are consenting adults who are 
completely honest with one another. There is a world of moral difference 
between an open marriage and infidelity, where the person who is not sexually 
exclusive conceals his or her behavior. Those who prefer monogamy should 
not summarily dismiss the likelihood that a plural marriage might work better 
than the alternatives for at least some individuals in some circumstances. 
At present, open marriages exist, swinging occurs, adultery is not 
uncommon, alternative lifestyles are not as hidden as they used to be, the 
meaning of sexual identity is being contested, transgender persons are less 
likely to be hidden from view, and premarital sexual activity is less likely to be 
condemned as immoral provided that neither person is too young nor in an 
exclusive relationship. In an era of no-fault divorce, almost all Americans put 
up with “serial polygamy” in which many people have more than one marital 
partner during their lifetimes. In 2013, a U.S. district court invalidated part of 
Utah’s anti-bigamy law.22 In the wake of this judicial decision, the New York 
Times broached the plural-marriage question.23 The more charitable media 
portrayal of polygamy, in conjunction with the ongoing battle over same-sex 
marriage, finally has prompted academics and others to discuss the quality of 
the rationale for not extending the right of marriage beyond couples. After all, 
it could be true that limiting the size of a marriage is as constitutionally 
problematic as restricting marriage to same-race or opposite-sex couples. 
II. GENDER INEQUALITY 
Constitutionally, same-sex marriage is an easier case than its plural 
counterpart.24 As of this writing, public opinion polls indicate that 55% 
Americans accept the former.25 For most scholars, none of the constitutional 
arguments against refusing to let same-sex couples marry are close to 
 
 22 Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013). 
 23 Should Plural Marriage Be Legal?, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE (Dec. 17, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/12/17/should-plural-marriage-be-legal. 
 24 For my characterization of same-sex marriage as an easy case, see RONALD C. DEN OTTER, JUDICIAL 
REVIEW IN AN AGE OF MORAL PLURALISM 245–61 (2009). 
 25 McCarthy, supra note 10. 
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compelling. Such arguments often contain controversial moral (or religious) 
and unproven empirical premises that people can (and do) reasonably reject. It 
is becoming increasingly evident that such arguments no longer can justify a 
conception of marriage that excludes gays and lesbians, are predicated on the 
superiority of heterosexuality, and cannot be squared with a commitment to 
legal equality. However a person casts her opposition to same-sex marriage, it 
will be difficult for her to maintain that how gays and lesbians are being 
treated satisfies the constitutional requirement of equal protection. When 
opponents of same-sex marriage contend that opposite-sex marriage is 
inherently superior, they are probably wrong, empirically and morally. Even if 
they were right about that, they still would be advancing a particular 
conception of marriage that would be, at the very least, constitutionally 
controversial inasmuch as the rationale for unequal treatment is not supposed 
to reflect an evaluation of the merits of such marriages. Their other option is to 
identify other state interests that excluding gays and lesbians from marriage are 
supposed to serve, which is not promising when the connection between those 
potential interests (such as promoting responsible procreation) and allowing 
same-sex couples to marry is so attenuated.26 Once the debate is framed in 
terms of freedom of marital choice and marital equality, the game is over for 
opponents of same-sex marriage. 
By contrast, plural marriage raises legitimate concerns about gender 
equality and whether women actually choose such marital arrangements. 
Probably the most serious objection to creating a constitutional right to plural 
marriage (or its equivalent on equal protection grounds) would be that to 
permit such marriage is to subordinate some women and condemn them to 
unhappiness or misery. Recently in Canada, the Bala Report attempted to 
document the kinds of harms that traditional polygyny inflicts upon women.27 
What understandably makes many progressive academics uneasy with the very 
idea of a person’s marrying more than one person at the same time, probably 
more than any other single factor, concerns the extent to which women in 
 
 26 See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 999–1000 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“The evidence 
supports two points which together show Proposition 8 does not advance any of the identified interests: 
(1) same-sex parents are of equal quality, and (2) Proposition 8 does not make it more likely that opposite-sex 
couples will marry and raise offspring biologically related to both parents.”); see also JO BECKER, FORCING 
THE SPRING: INSIDE THE FIGHT FOR MARRIAGE EQUALITY 215–18 (2014). 
 27 Nicholas Bala et al., An International Review of Polygamy: Legal and Policy Implications for Canada, 
in POLYGAMY IN CANADA: LEGAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN: A COLLECTION OF 
POLICY RESEARCH REPORTS 7–19 (2005). 
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traditional polygynous relationships never would be equals.28 Even if most 
polygynous marriages did not seriously harm women, they still are likely to be 
unequal in certain important respects (such as their division of domestic labor), 
and that likelihood could support the state’s not according them legal status. 
This objection presupposes not only that such women should not be able to 
choose an unequal marital relationship even when they are as fully informed as 
they can be about its likely nature but also conditions the public that they 
would have better lives in a different, more equal living arrangement (e.g., if 
they only married one person or did not marry at all). It is hard to imagine that 
the kind of woman who would choose a traditional polygynous marriage over 
the alternatives would find herself in a more equal setting if she were denied 
that option and then opted for a two-person marriage or polygynous 
cohabitation, as if both of them could be assumed to be sufficiently egalitarian. 
To deny an adult woman any kind of plural marriage, including a polygynous 
one, is not necessarily to save her from subordination in her personal life. After 
all, there is no way to know in advance what she would do if she were denied 
her first choice and had to settle for something else, which may not be 
preferable. 
Another response is to deny that if women had a menu of marital options, 
they would select polygyny even if some of them in fact would do so, probably 
for religious or cultural reasons. A plural marriage could be same-sex, could be 
polyandrous, or could be asexual. Thus, many of them may not resemble the 
kind of polygyny that has raised understandable worries in the past about the 
welfare of women in such living situations. Additionally, it seems improbable 
that large numbers of American women would select such an arrangement in 
the midst of an expanded range of marital options, coupled with less social and 
economic pressure on them to be a part of a more traditional, inegalitarian 
marital relationship. A woman might prefer a same-sex or platonic thruple, 
quad, or moresome over an opposite-sex monogamous marriage that 
incorporates an unequal, gendered division of labor and lacks shared 
decisionmaking. If gender equality is paramount, then a polyamorous 
arrangement could be the most promising option. 
 
 28 See, e.g., Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD 
FOR WOMEN? 7, 9–10 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999). 
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As philosophers would say, gender inequality is a contingent, rather than a 
conceptual, feature of polygamy.29 How unequal any marriage is turns out to 
be a function of its particulars. Alternatively, proponents of plural marriage 
may concede that even if most of these marriages were more often than not 
unequal, they would not be demonstrably worse in this way than monogamous 
marriages are and, consequently, should not be rejected on that basis. Even if 
most plural marriages were much worse in terms of gender equality, such an 
objection still would not necessarily be decisive. The state’s interest in 
promoting equality in personal relationships, known as internal equality, would 
have to override the importance of marital choice. This trade-off must be 
confronted, and those who are convinced that the former trumps the latter must 
defend their view without resorting to negative stereotypes about what all 
polygynous relationships are like. In Martha Nussbaum’s words, “[T]o rule 
that [opposite-sex] marriage as such should be illegal on the grounds that it 
reinforces male dominance would be an excessive intrusion upon liberty, even 
if one should believe marriage irredeemably unequal.”30 An individual cannot 
simply play the gender-equality card as if the mere fact that some plural 
marriages would be inegalitarian warrants denying legal recognition to all of 
its conceivable forms. Indeed, it is counterintuitive to ban unequal marriages 
but permit those that are otherwise dysfunctional, including violent ones, 
unless one is preoccupied with internal equality. A marriage could be 
sufficiently egalitarian yet lack love, caring, honesty, and other kinds of 
intimacy. One would have to be able to prove that the promotion of internal 
equality overrides the importance of protecting marital choice. That is easier 
said than done when all of us want at least some space to shape our intimate 
relationships to fit our idiosyncratic ends. In the context of intimate 
relationships, some of us may care more about internal equality than others. 
The above concerns about the unequal treatment of women in polygamous 
relationships have not arrived upon the scene recently. In the notorious 
Reynolds decision, the Court endorsed the double standard that many 
Americans still accept: monogamous intimate relationships tend to be equal 
enough, whereas polygamous ones always fall short.31 Even if a traditional 
polygynous marriage is likely to be less egalitarian than a monogamous one, 
though, it does not mean that the former is intrinsically superior to the latter. 
 
 29 Cheshire Calhoun, Who’s Afraid of Polygamy? Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage Advocacy from the 
History of Polygamy, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1023, 1038 (2005). 
 30 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX & SOCIAL JUSTICE 295 (1999). 
 31 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). 
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All intimate relationships are probably more equal in some respects than in 
others. An opposite-sex marriage may be more equal when it comes to 
domestic labor compared with another given marriage but less equal when it 
comes to, say, familial decisionmaking regarding the children, finances, or 
whose career is a priority. Current family law tries to account for what each 
person wants and, in doing so, acknowledges the importance of personal 
choice, flexibility, and familial diversity. More than a few people could be 
more emotionally satisfied in a multi-person relationship.32 Polyamorous 
marriages can serve as examples of how monogamous relationships and 
marriages could be improved.33 At minimum, those who oppose plural 
marriage will have to spell out their objections to expanding the legal 
definition of marriage without falling back upon anti-Mormon or anti-Muslim 
prejudices, negative stereotypes, questionable data, or overly sentimental views 
about monogamous marriage. 
The least controversial meaning of internal equality in any marriage is that 
power is evenly distributed in the collective decisionmaking (including over 
finances), and the couple, thruple, quad, or moresome has a more or less equal 
division of domestic labor and the same right to exit the relationship with an 
equitable division of the marital property and the same custody and visitation 
rights in the event that they have children. American family law tries to ensure 
that neither person, in a two-person marriage, is too disadvantaged when the 
marriage ends.34 The assumption about the state’s aforementioned interest in 
promoting equality in personal relationships animates feminist critiques of 
plural marriage. Although polygynous marriages may undermine gender 
equality, such inequality may have other causes that the state can address 
through regulatory schemes without condemning all plural marriages. If after 
experimenting with such marriages, it turns out that they do not further gender 
inequality or only have a negligible impact, the case for a constitutional right 
to plural marriage would be even more compelling. 
Not all feminists are opposed to plural marriage in the abstract. An 
increasing number of them are much more open to the idea than they used to 
 
 32 See David L. Chambers, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53, 81 (1997); 
Emens, supra note 2, at 284. 
 33 For example, advocates of polyamory call attention to the social importance of its five main principles: 
self-knowledge, radical honesty, consent, self-possession, and the avoidance of emotions like jealousy. See 
Emens, supra note 2, at 320–30. 
 34 WILLIAM BURNHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES 525 
(5th ed. 2011). 
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be. Cheshire Calhoun was one of the first feminist theorists to detach polygyny 
from its background conditions to show that plural marriages are not invariably 
inegalitarian.35 According to Martha Nussbaum, polygamy may be acceptable 
under some circumstances.36 She concedes that “[p]olygamy . . . is a 
structurally unequal practice.”37 In a traditional polygynous relationship, an 
asymmetry of power exists between the man and his wives, given its hub and 
wheel structure, where the man is romantically involved with everyone else but 
none of the women have that sort of relationship with one another, even though 
they may bond in other ways. The sole husband can marry other women, 
divorce his wives at will, and exercise other kinds of control over them with no 
accountability, creating a situation that invites the abuse of his power. For this 
reason, Nussbaum’s defense of polygamy is qualified, as it should be. She ties 
it to the possibility that plural marriages also could be polyandrous. For her, 
the best argument against polygamy is that “men are permitted plural 
marriages, and women are not.”38 
The standard legal position against plural marriage, then, is predicated on 
the view that the state has an important or compelling interest in ensuring 
decent treatment in intimate relationships. Nobody disputes that the state may 
enact laws to reduce intimate partner violence, spousal rape, and other 
sociopathic behaviors. The state also may bring into existence a 
community-property regime or equitable divorce laws requiring spousal and 
child support to reduce the likelihood that women and children are rendered 
economically vulnerable upon dissolution of the marriage. The state should 
intervene when one person is unquestionably harming another, even if they 
happen to be married or living together, and not ignore the fact that the 
husband frequently takes his earning power with him in the event of divorce. 
Nobody should have to remain in an unhappy or dangerous marriage because 
becoming single again is not a financially viable option. 
That said, even though the state may legislate to require employers to grant 
parental leave, to subsidize childcare, or to prevent sexual harassment in the 
workplace without violating the Constitution, laws that try to force equality 
upon those who would prefer to have an unequal marital relationship raise a 
related but distinct issue that calls for more subtle treatment than it usually 
receives. Because the Constitution shields choice in the most important aspects 
 
 35 Calhoun, supra note 29, at 1023–41. 
 36 NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 2, at 230. 
 37 NUSSBAUM, supra note 30, at 98. 
 38 NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE, supra note 2, at 197. 
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of their personal lives from unjustified legislative infringement,39 Americans 
ought to be able to choose to have an unequal marital relationship, at least until 
it dissolves. The well-known feminist challenge to the public–private 
dichotomy cannot entail that all behavior is subject to the authority of the state, 
including every single aspect of how partners relate to each other in their 
personal lives, because that understanding would leave no room for the 
personal freedom that all of us want to have. Legally, their vulnerability while 
the marriage lasts is one thing; their vulnerability after it ends is another. In a 
manner of speaking, to claim that people may not choose to have an unequal 
relationship is to undermine the constitutional principle that legislative 
majorities should not interfere with people’s most intimate decisions unless it 
has no other choice. In this respect, the American constitutional tradition is 
semi-libertarian. Absent harm or the serious risk of it, personal choice is called 
for. People are largely left alone to have the kind of marriage that they want 
even when it is unequal in some respects. At present, a spouse cannot have her 
right of support enforced until she is legally separated or divorced.40 
Nor does a marriage license require any specific conduct from either 
party.41 With few exceptions, family law is indifferent toward hierarchy and 
morally questionable behaviors more generally unless harm occurs. As 
Nussbaum remarks, “It just seems an intolerable infringement of liberty for the 
state to get involved in dictating how people do their dishes.”42 In sum, there 
are constitutional limits when it comes to how the state may attempt to regulate 
the behavior that takes place within a marriage or intimate relationship. The 
issue is what those limits are. The state cannot force a particular kind of 
intimate relationship upon women who desire to follow more traditional 
gender practices. In a liberal society, women are free to adopt whatever 
identity they want and live accordingly, even when their decision leaves 
something to be desired by feminist standards. Nor can the law force men to 
have more progressive attitudes. What the state can do, though, is legislate 
against the adverse consequences of such personal decisions when one or both 
persons want to end their marital relationship. No American lawmaking body 
 
 39 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (finding a law that criminalized consensual sexual 
conduct between to adults to be unconstitutional); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (recognizing the 
right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 
(finding that a law prohibiting the use of contraceptives unconstitutionally intruded on the right to privacy). 
 40 NUSSBAUM, supra note 30, at 98. 
 41 Id. 
 42 NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 2, at 280. 
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or court ever has conditioned the constitutional right to marriage on its actual 
or apparent equality while it lasts. 
As a result, opponents of plural marriage must show that the kind of gender 
inequality that is likely to exist in a plural marriage is not only unique but 
worse than other kinds that our society already tolerates. A just constitutional 
democracy is not committed to fostering internal equality at all costs, as in 
without regard to other constitutional principles. Exactly the same concern 
arises with respect to any familial relationship that is rooted in a gendered 
division of labor or other sexist beliefs and behaviors. Such an argument 
against plural marriage proves too much: it is not evident why most 
multi-person relationships cannot be reformed along egalitarian lines if their 
monogamous counterparts can be so reformed unless one is convinced that 
their structure alone renders them irredeemably inegalitarian. 
III. THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN 
When the public debate over plural marriage begins, critics will allege that 
such marriage is not conducive to the welfare of children. The vast majority of 
social scientists have come to believe that opposite-sex parents are not 
inherently superior to same-sex parents.43 Other variables, which are 
independent of gender of each person in the couple, like continuity of care, 
have a much greater impact on the psychological development of children. As 
Elizabeth Brake notes, different kinds of families, including less conventional 
ones, can provide such care.44 The quality of the parenting in particular 
instances depends on the ability, resources, and willingness of their 
caregiver(s) to meet the various needs of the children. In the real world, the 
most apt comparison is among various suboptimal options. Ultimately, the 
view that plural marriage will undermine the welfare of children cannot be 
successfully defended because (a) children can be protected more directly from 
harm, (b) the presence of more than two adults in a household may improve the 
quality of parenting more often than not, and (c) even if a substantial majority 
of multi-personal arrangements are not superior, the alternatives may be 
worse.45 If one takes a somewhat different tack by contending that plural 
 
 43 See CARLOS A. BALL, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND CHILDREN: A TALE OF HISTORY, SOCIAL SCIENCE, 
AND LAW (2014). 
 44 Elizabeth Brake, Minimal Marriage: What Political Liberalism Implies for Marriage Law, 120 ETHICS 
302, 318 (2010). 
 45 It is important to keep in mind that the relevant basis of comparison may not be two opposite-sex 
parents. In many cases, the alternative may be financially and emotionally worse for the children. On this 
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marital arrangements set a bad example for children, then one has to deal with 
the unfortunate fact that couples set bad examples for their own children (and 
for other children) through behaviors like alcohol and drug abuse, violence, 
manipulation, racism, sexism, homophobia, intolerance, out-of-control 
gambling, irresponsible spending, infidelity, callousness, excessive attention to 
physical appearance, and crass consumerism. 
Americans never have been and never will be licensed to be parents.46 A 
couple assumes legal responsibility for their children simply by procreating. 
Whether either individual has the minimum skills, the financial resources, or 
mental health to parent competently is beside the point. As a generalization, 
most parents are good in some respects and bad in others. They are not legally 
required to pay any attention to their children’s wishes, respect their autonomy, 
discern and nurture their talents, or even care about what they want to do with 
their lives. They may (and often do) foist their visions of the good life upon 
them. Provided that they do not abuse or neglect them, they can interact with 
them just about however they please, for better or for worse. In the debate over 
same-sex marriage, it is not hard to appreciate why the mantra of saving the 
children has been so effective. In principle, Americans rarely oppose anything 
that is supposed to improve the lives of children. 
However, upon closer inspection, “saving the children” begins to look too 
much like a rhetorical technique used to make it seem as if favoring the legal 
option of plural marriage would be tantamount to indifference to how children 
are raised. At present, marriage privatizes dependency.47 The legal duties that 
parents have towards their children already have been detached from the 
marital relationship. After all, many biological parents hardly live up to the 
ideal. Even if, more often than not, two married, biological parents constitute 
the best parenting arrangement, individualized assessment still would be called 
for inasmuch as child welfare remains the overarching concern. Americans 
should care less about the form of a marriage and more about its particular 
dynamics, regardless of its configuration, if what is at stake concerns how 
children are being prepared for adulthood. Not many of us think that bad 
parents should be automatically divorced if they are married and prohibited 
 
point, see Mark Goldfeder & Elisabeth Sheff, Children of Polyamorous Families: A First Empirical Look, 5 J. 
L. & SOC. DEVIANCE 150, 166–69 (2013).  
 46 However, the most compelling argument probably ever formulated in support of licensing parents is 
found in Hugh Lafollette, Licensing Parents, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 182 (1980). 
 47 See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 108 (2004); 
Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?, in JUST MARRIAGE 46 (Mary Lyndon Shanley ed., 2004). 
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from marrying and having children ever again. A return to a fault divorce 
regime may not benefit children if that policy change fails to take into account 
the costs of preserving marriages that are characterized by conflict.48 In some 
cases, parents who stay together are making a horrific mistake. The burdens 
that women and children may bear if it were harder for couples to end their 
marriages cannot be wished away.49 The main advantages of two parents, 
compared with a single parent, lie in higher income and more thorough 
supervision.50 At minimum, policymakers should avoid the kind of 
sentimentality that prevents clear-headed, empirically sophisticated, and 
morally nuanced analysis of the familial conditions under which children 
typically thrive. 
This child-welfare rationale for not permitting same-sex marriage may 
extend to polygamy. If multi-person relationships are bad for children, then 
that is another argument against legal recognition of such relationships. On the 
one hand, those who oppose plural marriage still can play the child-welfare 
card by insisting that plural marriage is not an ideal environment for children 
even if it does not increase the likelihood that they will be abused or 
neglected.51 On the other hand, children may be loved and cared for in 
unconventional families provided that their caregivers have the necessary skills 
and the motivation to use them. Three or more parental figures could be 
advantageous in most situations. Adolescents may benefit from having more 
than two adults to talk to about their lives and from whom they can receive 
advice. It is probably fair to say that most children and young adults are more 
inclined to discuss important issues with one parent rather than the other, and 
some of them may not feel comfortable sharing any aspect of their personal 
lives, like their problems, fears, and self-doubts, with either parent. Recently, 
the state of California enacted legislation that allows children to have more 
than two legal parents.52 The presence of multiple parental figures not only 
reflects the existence of blended families; it also probably would benefit 
children more often than not due to better coordination in their efforts to 
nurture their children and provide for their emotional and material needs. 
 
 48 JUDITH STACEY, IN THE NAME OF THE FAMILY: RETHINKING FAMILY VALUES IN THE POSTMODERN 
AGE 78–80 (1996).  
 49 FINEMAN, supra note 47, at 87. 
 50 NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE 
LAW 74 (2008). 
 51 See, e.g., BHIKHU PAREKH, RETHINKING MULTICULTURALISM: CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND POLITICAL 
THEORY 290 (2000). 
 52 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040 (West Supp. 2015).  
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At present, the sample size of polygamous and polyamorous families is too 
small to generate any reliable results about how well “poly parents” parent.53 
As such, the jury is still out. Some vocal critics of polygamy concede that more 
data on contemporary polygamous families is needed before how they impact 
children can be evaluated.54 This much is certain: the empirical case against 
plural marriage on child welfare grounds has not yet come close to being 
corroborated by the evidence if the burden of proof lies with those who allege 
the children cannot flourish with more than two parental figures. It may not 
take an entire village to raise a child but it stands to reason that, other things 
being equal, parental multiplicity may be even more conducive to meeting 
children’s needs. In fact, the existence of more than two caregivers may turn 
out to be the superior parenting arrangement. 
Other critics of polygamy maintain that the practice facilitates child abuse 
and that the state should be able to ban it to shield children from such harm. 
The trouble with this view is that (1) parenting can be detached from marriage 
or marriage-like relationships, and (2) almost all people can practice polygamy 
without abusing or neglecting the children. Utah, which has a history of 
persecuting certain polygynous families, leaves such families alone unless 
serious crimes occur. Under its penal code, criminal liability only results from 
the participants’ trying to marry in a private ceremony or representing 
themselves as being married.55 Even if it could be proven that children who 
grow up in polygamous households are more at risk of being abused or 
neglected than those who grow up in a more traditional family, it is not 
acceptable to proscribe an otherwise legitimate practice merely because it 
“tends to encourage” other kinds of crimes.56 The penal code can directly 
address the worst problems associated with traditional, religiously motivated 
polygyny, such as underage girls being coerced into marriages, sexually 
assaulted, and physically abused.57 Those who commit such felonies should be 
prosecuted for what they have done, like anyone else, regardless of the context. 
 
 53 However, some recent qualitative research shows that concerns about poly-parenting may be 
exaggerated. See Goldfeder & Sheff, supra note 45. 
 54 See, e.g., Strassberg, supra note 14, at 560. 
 55 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101 (West 2004), invalidated in part by Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 
1170 (D. Utah 2013). 
 56 Samantha Slark, Study Note, Are Anti-Polygamy Laws an Unconstitutional Infringement on the 
Liberty Interests of Consenting Adults?, 6 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 451, 458 (2004). 
 57 Elizabeth F. Emens, Just Monogamy?, in JUST MARRIAGE, supra note 47, at 75, 76. 
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Nationally, the overwhelming majority of abused and neglected children do 
not grow up in polygamous households.58 Because many two-person intimate 
relationships and marriages damage children, it is not evident that plural forms 
are or would be worse under more ideal conditions.59 A plural marriage may 
turn out to be more conducive to the raising of children with the advantages 
that come with multiple caregivers and multiple incomes. Polygamous parents 
could more easily institute a more efficient division of labor than couples and 
single parents with respect to parenting responsibilities. It is no secret that 
there are not enough hours in the day or days in the week for most couples to 
cross off everything on their lists, especially when both of them work outside 
the home to earn two incomes. Also, a plural marriage may turn out to be good 
for children because one parent leaving the marriage or dying probably would 
not be as disruptive.60 
The possibility that, on average, thruples or moresomes constitute a 
superior parenting framework cannot be ruled out. Most people have few 
concerns with close friends or relatives sharing in the performance of parental 
duties when necessary. This is one of the reasons why, compared with 
single-person and even two-person households, extended families are capable 
of providing better childcare; additional persons can work together to do 
whatever needs to be done. In this country, it is common for couples that work 
outside the home and can afford to hire help for childcare to do so. Moreover, 
the effect of a bad or mediocre parent might be offset when a better parent 
could do what either the bad parent does not want to do or cannot do 
competently. Normally, the quality of parenting in a given household would 
reflect whether the adults have the motivation, parenting skills, economic and 
social resources, and time to devote to raising their children. The point is not 
that moresomes always are terrific parents. All human beings have 
shortcomings and some circumstances can be trying even for the best of 
parents. A single mother or father may turn out to be better than a couple or 
thruple. Rather, it is almost meaningless to discuss the likely quality of 
parenting in the abstract. At most, without knowledge of all of the relevant 
details, one can do no more than speculate. Until American lawmakers prohibit 
the worst parents from having or raising children or implement a licensing 
 
 58 Expert Witness Report Prepared for the Amicus Curiae by Jonathan Turley at paras. 167, 170, 
Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, 2011 BCSC 1588 (Can.) (No. S-097767), available 
at https://jonathanturley.files.wordpress.com/2010/11/turley-affidavit.pdf [hereinafter Expert Report]. 
 59 Will Kymlicka, Rethinking the Family, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 77, 92 & n.17 (1991). 
 60 See PHILIP L. KILBRIDE & DOUGLAS R. PAGE, PLURAL MARRIAGE FOR OUR TIMES: A REINVENTED 
OPTION? 10–11 (2d ed. 2012). 
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scheme, the argument that plural marriages should not be allowed because they 
do not serve the welfare of children cannot get off the ground. 
IV. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
A. Liberal Neutrality 
The first three Parts of this Article elaborate on the weakness of the state’s 
two main interests—ensuring gender equality in marriages and promoting child 
welfare—in not permitting plural marriage. In terms of standards of review, 
they may not be important or compelling, which is what strict or intermediate 
scrutiny would call for and they may fall short of being legitimate inasmuch as 
they are rooted in animus.61 Just as the state must have an adequate 
constitutional rationale not to grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples, it 
also must have such a rationale for not allowing a person who already is 
married to marry someone else or for a person who is not already married to 
marry someone who already is married. The kinds of reasons that opponents of 
plural marriage muster on behalf of their view purport to have something to do 
with a connection between numerical restrictions and preventing harms. Not 
only are those reasons empirically far from certain, given the inherent 
difficulty of causal inference, but they are morally controversial as well. 
Under conditions of moral pluralism, the state is not supposed to favor 
particular conceptions of the good at the expense of others as long as the 
conceptions in question are reasonable by not harming third parties or putting 
them at risk. Among political theorists and philosophers, the very idea of 
neutrality is contentious, and those who endorse some version of it are likely to 
dispute its meaning and application in borderline cases. The reality of sincere 
and reasonable disagreement, though, has never caused them to waver in their 
confidence in the soundness of their arguments of political morality. They 
continue to write, more often than not, as if they could not possibly be wrong. 
With the exception of perfectionists, many liberals adhere to one version of 
such neutrality or another by being committed to the principle that the state 
 
 61 Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor make clear that such a justification is suspect in the context of 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013); 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996). For a recent and 
interesting take on animus, see Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection for Animus, 2013 SUP. 
CT. REV. 183. 
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should not dictate to people what kind of life they ought to have.62 As far as the 
state is concerned, the meaning of life is in the eye of the beholder. For 
anti-perfectionist liberals, such neutrality excludes appeals to controversial 
moral beliefs when the state enacts public laws. The state would violate such 
neutrality, for instance, if it promoted only one kind of sexual behavior, love, 
or intimacy on the ground that it was intrinsically superior. Whatever else may 
be said against same-sex marriage, the disparate treatment of gays and lesbians 
cannot be justified as a means of endorsing heterosexism—that is, validating 
opposite-sex intimate relationships or being straight. 
American constitutional law incorporates something similar to a neutrality 
requirement in which the state may not compel or even encourage people to 
live certain kinds of lives because one way of living is inherently better than 
others.63 The religion clauses of the First Amendment reflect the principle that 
the state should not use its power to endorse one religion over others. The 
doctrine of substantive due process, which emphasizes personal choice and 
liberty, is at odds with the idea that the state can try to dictate to people how 
they should live their lives. For Bedi, “[T]here is some synergy between liberal 
neutrality and the Equal Protection Clause.”64 One way to understand the 
deeper purpose of equal protection doctrine is to see it as a restriction on the 
extent to which the state may enact legislative classifications that favor some 
groups over others, thereby making it more difficult for the disadvantaged 
minority to have a better life. It may be unconstitutional, then, for the state to 
confer the status of marriage on some intimate relationships but not on others. 
As long as the state stays in the marriage business, neutrality implies that the 
state must respect the right of all competent adults to choose the marital 
arrangement that best suits their particular needs. Even if most people were 
made healthier, wealthier, and happier by being married to only one person, the 
state still may not promote a parochial conception of marriage or continue 
mononormative or amatonormative practices. The constitutional principle of 
neutrality means that the state should not advance controversial conceptions of 
the good.65 Thus, the state may not deliberately advance such conceptions in 
 
 62 TAMARA METZ, UNTYING THE KNOT: MARRIAGE, THE STATE, AND THE CASE FOR THEIR DIVORCE 
106–07 (2010). 
 63 For the view that such a neutrality requirement is to be found in the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, see Wilfrid Waluchow, On the Neutrality of Charter Reasoning, in NEUTRALITY AND THEORY OF 
LAW 203 (Jordi Ferrer Beltrán et al. eds., 2013). 
 64 BEDI, supra note 11, at 15. 
 65 STEVEN WALL, LIBERALISM, PERFECTIONISM AND RESTRAINT 41 (1998).  
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the absence of an adequate justification that is independent of the “merits” of 
the way of life in question. 
This Article does not intend to offer another philosophical defense of such 
neutrality but instead to see what follows constitutionally from such a 
commitment with respect to marriage. Because the principle of neutrality limits 
the extent to which the state may interfere with their personal decisions and 
may treat people unequally, states may be constitutionally required to grant 
marriage licenses to plural marriage enthusiasts when states already give such 
licenses to opposite and same-sex couples that meet the other valid 
requirements. That conclusion may seem radical at this particular moment in 
American history, but its time may come someday. After all, many 
contemporary, well-established constitutional understandings were once 
widely believed to be lacking constitutional support. In particular, the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses have been be construed in ways that 
their authors and ratifiers never would have anticipated. For example, it is 
remarkable how rapidly what was once an unthinkable constitutional position 
(namely that the state must accord legal status to same-sex couples) has 
morphed into a view that no liberal would reject and many conservatives are 
acquiescing to because the writing is on the wall. At the very least, even if this 
Article only preaches to the converted, fails to move anybody off the fence, 
and does not convince a single person who initially opposed plural marriage, 
its aim is to establish that the constitutional position that it develops and 
defends is more than tenable. 
B. The Constitutional Principle of Autonomy 
From the standpoint of substantive due process, the significance of being 
able to select multiple marital partners cannot be overestimated. This section 
explains why a competent adult should be able to marry however many people 
she wants for just about whatever personal reasons she happens to have, unless 
a marriage is so large and complex that it becomes administratively 
unmanageable. That already is the situation for couples that satisfy the other 
eligibility requirements, at least for opposite-sex ones in all states and for 
same-sex ones in well over half of states. The basic strategy of this Article is to 
call attention to the double standard under which the state does not examine the 
quality of the reasons that most couples have for wanting to marry, yet at the 
same time assume that the reasons that people have for wanting a plural 
marriage cannot be satisfactory. Before getting to equal protection analysis, 
this Article articulates how marital choice is as important as other kinds of 
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personal choices that the Court shields from legislative encroachment, such as 
whether to use birth control, to have a child, to have consensual sex with 
another adult, or to end one’s life.66 As Nussbaum states, “Articulating and 
protecting . . . spheres of personal liberty has been a crucial task of our 
tradition of constitutional law.”67 No doubt, it would be harder to establish a 
constitutional right to plural marriage if Americans did not live in the shadow 
of marriage—that is, if, apart from the material and expressive benefits that 
come with it, marriage were not laden with so many shared social meanings. 
In 2015, most Americans care deeply about being allowed to make the most 
personal of personal decisions, including whom to marry, and often are not 
indifferent to their own marital status or that of others. As misguided as any 
personal decision may turn out, under existing constitutional doctrine, there is 
a strong presumption in favor of letting competent adults decide what they 
want to do. The more personal the decision is, the higher the likelihood that the 
state cannot interfere with it. It is hard to imagine too many personal decisions 
that are more important, for most people, than the decision about how to 
arrange their intimate lives. 
As this section shows, the well-entrenched constitutional right of personal 
choice, or autonomy, extends to the right to marry more than one person at the 
same time, particularly when the importance of such choice in a society like 
our own is so high and the importance of countervailing state interests is so 
low. This Article interprets “privacy” to be synonymous with autonomy—that 
is, one’s capacity to formulate a conception of the good life and act 
accordingly with undue interference by the state. In equating privacy with the 
broader concept of personal liberty, this Article is not breaking new ground.68 
Its novelty comes from connecting the exercise of autonomy to marital choice, 
including being able to select a multi-person marriage. One has to wonder how 
controversial the right to privacy would be, whatever it is called, if it had not 
served as the foundation of the Roe v. Wade decision,69 which many 
 
 66 I stick with fundamental-rights analysis and do not venture into the territory of fundamental rights 
under equal protection because if a right is fundamental, strict scrutiny applies. On this point, see ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 691–92 (4th ed. 2011). 
 67 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW, at xvi (2010). 
 68 See, e.g., DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF 
ROE V. WADE 659, 916 n.25, 939 n.92 (1998).  
 69 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
DEN OTTER GALLEYSPROOFS2 5/27/2015  2:13 PM 
2015] THREE MAY NOT BE A CROWD 2003 
Americans reject.70 While the word “privacy” can be more trouble than it is 
worth, it has not ceased to capture the place of autonomy (and agency) in our 
constitutional tradition. 
Just as importantly, the term reflects how critical it is to give all people as 
much freedom as possible so that they can pursue even their idiosyncratic ends. 
A society like ours that is committed to protecting such freedom as an end in 
itself or as a means to human flourishing, then, cannot simply defer to 
legislative judgments in such situations, as if it were self-evident that 
lawmakers can be trusted to protect minority groups and foster individual 
rights. Judicial review in America always will be predicated on the belief that 
legislative majorities have a tendency to exceed their authority and be hostile 
or unsympathetic to legitimate differences. A commitment to constitutionalism 
does not have to take the form of American-style judicial review, but 
Americans have grown accustomed to delegating to judges the power to 
determine constitutional limits in real cases, and that state of affairs will not 
disappear in the foreseeable future. As rare as it is these days, judicial restraint 
or deference should not be praised when the alternative, namely judicial 
abdication, is worse. There is no point in granting the power of judicial review 
to judges if they are not inclined to use it to check lawmakers who act 
unconstitutionally. 
In the abstract, most Americans value personal choice in other contexts and 
therefore are reluctant to let lawmakers make such decisions for them, unless 
the state is unequivocally justified in denying such choice. In the midst of the 
widely held belief that competent adults are supposed to have as much control 
as possible over their lives, it is surprising that so many academics are so 
dismissive of the case for a constitutional right to plural marriage. The vast 
majority of them have given little thought to the matter. That they are not 
doing so is no longer excusable as the debate over same-sex marriage comes to 
an end. And, their defense of monogamy cannot simply invoke gender equality 
or the purported foolishness of wanting to experiment with a plural marriage. 
True, people often make cognitive errors in trying to achieve their goals.71 One 
could concede this point, which is found in the literature in social psychology 
and behavioral economics, and nonetheless maintain that as far as the law is 
concerned, you are the expert about your own life or at least better informed 
 
 70 Ashley Southall, Abortion Opponents March in Washington on Anniversary of Roe v. Wade Decision, 
NY TIMES LEDE NEWS BLOG (Jan. 22, 2014, 8:09 PM), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/01/22/abortion-
opponents-march-in-washington-on-anniversary-of-roe-v-wade-decision/. 
 71 SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY: JUSTIFYING COERCIVE PATERNALISM 2 (2013).  
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than others. Under the marital status quo, each person not only has a right to 
marry one (unmarried) consenting adult, but the couple can more or less 
structure their shared life however they please unless they physically harm 
each other. How could it be otherwise when our society continues to make 
considerable room for individual, religious, and cultural differences, and to 
permit unconventional beliefs and the practices that follow from them? This 
right to select a marital partner is predicated on the belief that most persons 
differ in what they are looking for in an intimate partner and what they want 
their intimate relationships to be like in terms of their aspirations, expectations, 
interactions, respective workloads, finances, and collective decisionmaking. 
Their feelings about what is most important to them may change over time, 
especially when their circumstances do not remain constant. 
The trouble with the family-values movement in this country and its 
traditional views about marriage is that—in addition to demeaning the intimate 
lives of gays and lesbians—those views are often based on the poorly defended 
view that a certain kind of family structure is superior to others. Because it is 
almost self-evident that the claim is not only false but pernicious, 
notwithstanding its ongoing rhetorical force in some circles, the central 
assumption of this Article is that one size does not fit all with respect to 
marriage, and thus, the more options, the better. Having a wide range of 
intimate relationships to choose from not only makes normative sense by 
enhancing marital flexibility, but the act of according all of them legal status 
informs the public that no particular kind of marriage or family is preferable. 
When it comes to the problem of the state only endorsing opposite-sex 
marriage, the solution, which an ever expanding number of Americans favor, is 
to equalize the two types of marriage by making the legal definition of 
marriage more inclusive. 
It is increasingly harder to maintain that the average same-sex marriage is 
demonstrably worse than its opposite-sex counterpart. In fact, to their credit, 
when they are not making comparisons, many conservative Christian 
denominations do not idealize marriage and devote resources to help 
(opposite-sex) couples work through their marital problems.72 When 
traditionalists do not place real opposite-sex monogamous marriages on a 
pedestal, they do not necessarily think that the best same-sex marriage is better 
 
 72 See, e.g., Anthony J. Garascia, Counseling, FOR YOUR MARRIAGE, http://www.foryourmarriage.org/ 
support/ (last visited May 17, 2015) (Catholic marriage counseling); Marriage and Family Therapists, 
METHODIST COUNSELING CENTER, http://www.methodistcounseling.org/staff (last visited May 17, 2015). 
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than the worst opposite-sex one, but they come close to doing so. They seem to 
be conceding that, regardless of their gender composition, some opposite-sex 
marriages will be dysfunctional. Of course, they could, as they have done in 
the past, continue to appeal to the definition of marriage that they take for 
granted. This strategy cannot work as long as the issue to be resolved centers 
on how marriage should be defined for legal purposes. They cannot simply 
conclude that marriage is only between a man and a woman because marriage 
is only between a man and a woman (which is circular reasoning). What is 
underappreciated is the extent to which they give ground with respect to 
whether a same-sex relationship without children could be functional and even 
fulfilling, regardless of whether the state treats it as a marriage or a 
marriage-like relationship. The risk of basing one’s position on empirical 
claims is that when more data becomes available, one’s position may be 
undermined. To keep open the question of the quality of same-sex marriages is 
to reveal curiosity about what might turn out be true. If some same-sex 
marriages exhibit at least some of the virtues that opposite-sex marriages are 
supposed to exhibit—like caregiving, selflessness, sacrifice, and 
commitment—then it is not a stretch to believe that but for what a religious 
source allegedly says about them, they would be worthy of acceptance. 
Likewise, polygamous relationships could be characterized by the same kinds 
of admirable behaviors that Americans hope couples will display. There is no 
reason in principle to deny that a plural marriage could be loving or caring.73 In 
fact, such a marriage may be better in some respects, including how children 
are raised.74 
As noted, our constitutional practice incorporates a commitment to 
something like autonomy, in the sense of giving competent adults the 
maximum freedom to pursue the ends that they find most worthwhile, 
whatever that happens to be, and be able to learn what works best for them. At 
present, whether they realize it, Americans have little marital choice. If they 
had more choice, they might think and act more unconventionally, which 
should be encouraged in a society that is enamored with conformity more than 
it is willing to admit. With a more inclusive conception of marriage in place, 
Americans might not be overly optimistic about their marital expectations. 
After all, each marriage will have ups and downs and varying dynamics as 
 
 73 Elizabeth Brake, Recognizing Care: The Case for Friendship and Polyamory, SYRACUSE L. & CIVIC 
ENGAGEMENT F., http://slace.syr.edu/slace-journal-vol-1/recognizing-care-the-case-for-friendship-and-
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 74 See ELISABETH SHEFF, THE POLYAMORISTS NEXT DOOR: INSIDE MULTI-PARTNER RELATIONSHIPS AND 
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long as people have different personalities and as long as circumstances do not 
remain static. In the name of marital diversity, then, it is more than conceivable 
the state may be committing a serious wrong by reinforcing marital norms that 
make it harder for individuals to think and act unconventionally in their 
intimate relationships. Independent of not respecting their autonomy, the 
specific outcomes, namely personal happiness or satisfaction, may be optimal 
when they have a longer menu to select from, including nonsexual marriages 
between or among close friends. 
In any society that venerates monogamy, it may be hard to comprehend 
why anyone would prefer marital multiplicity. One scholar doubts that much 
emotional intimacy could exist among multiple persons.75 Many episodes of 
HBO’s Big Love depict the challenges of a four-person polygynous 
“marriage.” However, the same concern is just as applicable to many of the 
important personal decisions that most people make during their lifetimes, 
including those involving intimate relationships. Maybe those who put plural 
marriage under a microscope should worry more about how much intimacy 
actually exists in much more widespread monogamous marriages. Usually, 
critics compare the worst kinds of polygynous relationships with ideal 
monogamous ones, as if the latter could not be dysfunctional. Some people 
will complement each other perfectly, whereas others will bring out the worst 
in each other in intimate relationships. Even when they are not violent or 
otherwise abusive, many married couples interact in unhealthy ways, in some 
instances for most of their lifetimes. Nor do a lot of them display the 
willingness or ability to work through their own problems to achieve the 
intimacy that both of them probably desire. As one commentator observes,  
The law determines who is eligible for marriage . . . but it says almost 
nothing about what marriage itself consists in; it is a contract without 
content. The law prescribes no behaviors, not even sexual 
consummation, that must be exhibited in order to marry or stay 
married. It dictates no requirements for the living arrangements of 
married people.76 
It is revealing that some critics of plural marriage, who seem so concerned 
about the likely lack of emotional intimacy in plural relationships, have little or 
no interest in policing the emotional intimacy of monogamous couples. To 
respect personal choice in this context, to repeat, is not to approve of the 
 
 75 Samuel C. Rickless, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage: A Response to Calhoun, 42 SAN DIEGO L. 
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choices that people happen to make about whom to marry and how they will 
conduct themselves. In states that now permit both types of couples to marry, 
the meaning of marriage is left to the man and man, woman and woman, or 
man and woman. Unless one is wedded to the view that there is something 
unnatural about allowing two adults of the same sex to marry each other or that 
a religious source condemns it, the double standard that this Article concerns 
itself with is increasingly hard to defend in the wake of the increased marital 
freedom for same-sex couples that now exists in this country. The 
constitutional right to autonomy—what one can believe, say, or do—never 
hinged on the wisdom of the personal choice in question. To respect the 
exercise of such autonomy is to empower competent adults to make personal 
choices, some of which will turn out to be mistaken. But, the implication of the 
possibility or even likelihood of regrets is not enough for the state to take away 
such personal choice and save competent adults from the consequences of their 
poor judgment. For instance, as evidenced by the high divorce rate, for many 
persons, particularly younger ones, the decision to marry is erroneous.77 It 
probably would not be a bad idea to set the minimum age for a marriage 
license at thirty where more people are financially stable and mature enough to 
undertake the responsibilities that marriage demands. Along similar lines, the 
state could regulate childbearing and childrearing more strictly if the primary 
concern involves outcomes and not the value of making the personal choice. 
That said, such proposals are constitutionally unthinkable, even if they 
were motivated by the best of intentions. The Constitution does not require the 
decision to have a child or marry (one person) to be minimally informed. With 
respect to monogamous marriage, neither person is asked to put serious 
thought into the decision even though one or both of them may subsequently 
have second thoughts. At most, the state could entice them to do so by 
providing financial incentives to receive premarital counseling. A profoundly 
personal choice, like whom to marry, is assumed to be at minimum 
semiautonomous, and those who marry reap the benefits or suffer the 
consequences. Competent adults are treated as if their marital decision is 
sufficiently well-informed, and this legal treatment does not account for the 
risk factors. Even if social scientists could accurately identify the risks, the 
Constitution still would allow competent adults to exercise their own 
judgment. Contemporary marriage law is virtually silent about how couples 
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must interact with each other.78 They do not have to live together, pool their 
finances, cooperate, treat each other nicely, be mutually emotionally 
supportive, or love each other; they only must refrain from harming each other. 
Within such a minimally regulated monogamous marriage, “individuals are 
free to create a variety of meanings of marriage for themselves.”79 If personal 
choice more generally were not so important, then the state might be able to 
force women to have abortions or compel fathers to marry the mothers of their 
children. 
The final push for same-sex marriage equality seems to reaffirm why most 
Americans value the institution and want the state to remain involved with it 
despite a decrease in the marriage rate. The existence of a menu of marital 
options would make marriage more voluntary, move people to be more 
reflective, and strengthen the institution on the assumption that fewer 
uninformed people would marry. After all, marriage should be treated as a 
morally serious decision given its potential to harm the participants and third 
parties. It is hard to imagine that Americans ever will be anti-marriage in the 
sense they would not marry under any circumstances. If you do not think that 
marital choice is important, use your imagination to envision a society in 
which the state arranges all marriages not for eugenic purposes, a la Plato, but 
to generate better outcomes, such as fewer divorces or more low-conflict 
marriages. Ultimately, almost everyone would prefer to make such marital 
choices for themselves, even if they knew that they would not choose wisely, 
because the value of such a choice never can be reduced to its likely 
consequences. 
C. The Implications of Lawrence 
A constitutional right to plural marriage is shorthand for giving people as 
much discretion as possible to customize their marital arrangements. The more 
important the choice is in terms of her life plan, the more the state should be 
inclined to defer to that individual’s judgment in a constitutional democracy 
that does not leave all of its political decisions to legislative majorities. 
Although Lawrence v. Texas is not an inkblot test, the case provides support 
for the view that lawmakers cannot prevent people from forming, revising, and 
pursuing their respective conceptions of the good without adequate 
 
 78 I borrow the term “internal marriage,” which covers the personal interactions of the couple, from 
MILTON C. REGAN, JR., ALONE TOGETHER: LAW AND THE MEANING OF MARRIAGE 5 (1999). 
 79 FINEMAN, supra note 47, at 97. 
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justification.80 Like Laurence Tribe, one can construe the holding as creating a 
broad constitutional right of autonomy.81 Lawrence should play a central role 
in the coming debate over plural marriage because it helps to establish the 
constitutional right of marital choice. Justice Kennedy begins his majority 
opinion in Lawrence by writing that “[f]reedom extends beyond spatial 
bounds” and speaking of the “transcendent dimensions” of liberty.82 Law is 
interpretive, and the kind language found in the majority opinion invites 
interpreters to expand the constitutional right to autonomy to cover situations 
that involve the most personal of personal decisions.83 The freedom to select 
intimate partners would be less imperative if doing so had nothing to do with 
the quality of one’s life. Shortly thereafter, Kennedy writes, this “case involves 
liberty of the person in both its spatial and more transcendent dimensions.”84 
To see Lawrence as a case merely about same-sex sexual activity (or sexual 
activity more generally) is to miss the forest for the trees. 
Similarly, Bowers v. Hardwick was wrongly decided not only because it 
makes it too easy for states to prohibit certain kinds of consensual sex acts, 
which should not be illegal in the first place and stigmatize certain sexual 
minorities (particularly gay men), but, just as importantly, because 
anti-sodomy laws interfere with the intimacy that any couple may try to 
develop and express as they come to know each other more than superficially. 
The anti-sodomy law in Georgia applied to all couples, including the most 
committed ones, and was not simply about the right to perform certain kinds of 
sex acts in the privacy of one’s home for bodily pleasure.85 To reduce all 
sexual activity to such pleasure or procreation is to be obtuse. That is not to say 
that all couples always want to be physically intimate with each other, but it is 
to say that most of them do and that to make anal and oral sex illegal is to 
deprive any committed couple of what might be an essential part of the kind of 
intimacy they want to have. That such an act cannot result in reproduction is 
beside the constitutional point. When it interferes in this manner, with such a 
flimsy justification that relies on a narrow interpretation of tradition, the state 
exceeds its authority. As long as what the couple is doing is consensual and 
 
 80 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571, 577–78 (2003). 
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117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1896–1900 (2004). 
 82 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. 
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they are not breaking other valid laws, the couple should be able to relate to 
each other however they please. 
When someone finds it constitutionally acceptable to allow lawmakers to 
ban only same-sex sex, as the three dissenters did in Lawrence, the red flag is 
even redder.86 Just like straight persons, gays and lesbians have a fundamental 
right to form, revise, and pursue their life plans. One could acknowledge this 
point yet not go so far as to believe that marriage is as constitutionally 
important as the personal freedom to be intimate with others and express that 
intimacy as he or she sees fit. Marriage is not a means to an end or an end in 
itself for some people, and it is not unreasonable, even in 2015, to eschew 
marriage inasmuch as one believes that it is a patriarchal or heterosexist 
institution that is beyond redemption. The point is that, given its material and 
symbolic benefits in a society like ours, most Americans will not be indifferent 
to their marital status. In his dissent in Lawrence, Justice Scalia fails to 
distinguish a law that criminalizes consensual same-sex sex acts from 
same-sex marriage.87 After all, it is not illogical to take the view that even 
when the state cannot proscribe same-sex sex, it still does not have to 
recognize same-sex unions. However, even a cursory look at Lawrence reveals 
that the Court did not come close to equating the right to engage in same-sex 
sexual intercourse with same-sex marriage or even civil unions. As Kennedy 
writes, this case “does not involve whether government must give formal 
recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”88 
In fairness to Scalia, one can speculate about the implications of the 
majority opinion, which does not speak for itself and may come to have a 
broader meaning in the future. Precedents do not apply themselves, can be 
ignored, and legal reasoning is not like an LSAT logic game. Scalia alleges 
Kennedy’s conception of autonomy foreshadows judicial recognition of 
same-sex marriage.89 Ultimately, Scalia may be more right than he is wrong in 
connecting what the Court said in Lawrence to the future meaning of marriage. 
American constitutional history amply demonstrates that no one can know with 
anything like certainty that the current interpretation of the holding of a 
 
 86 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[M]en can violate the law only with other men, and 
women only with other women. But this cannot itself be a denial of equal protection, since it is precisely the 
same distinction regarding partner that is drawn in state laws prohibiting marriage with someone of the same 
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 87 Id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 88 Id. at 578 (majority opinion). 
 89 Id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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particular case at one moment forecloses its application to subsequent fact 
patterns in unanticipated ways. There may be adequate reasons to justify a ban 
on plural marriages that do not exist with respect to criminalizing same-sex sex 
acts. Lawrence easily could stand for a strong presumption in favor of freedom 
of choice in the most important aspects of people’s private lives.90 Or, it may 
mean that mere moral disapproval, as a rationale for regulating people’s 
private lives, is suspect.91 Regardless, nobody thinks that Lawrence provided 
constitutional support for a state’s continuing resistance to same-sex 
marriage.92 
In a post-Lawrence world, then, it is not as easy as it used to be for the state 
to interfere with people’s private lives by limiting their choice of marriage 
partners. Mere moral disapproval of same-sex consensual sex no longer 
justifies criminalization. As noted, the idea that people exercise their autonomy 
or freedom of choice poorly, with respect to either their means or ends, is 
constitutionally neither here nor there. Someone may make sad, or even tragic, 
personal choices, but that possibility does not adequately justify state 
interference with the most important features of that person’s private life 
unless compelling reasons for such interference exist. And a “compelling” 
reason does not mean any reason that the state happens to come up with.93 The 
rationale for intervention cannot be the poor quality of the decisionmaking 
process or the likely undesirable outcome of the choice for the agent. Under 
the status quo, many individuals make awful choices regarding whether to 
marry. They may marry the worst possible partner for them or marry for the 
wrong reasons. When they later have buyer’s remorse, the state does not 
interfere; it is up to them to decide how they want to proceed. An unhappy 
marriage with some good days may be better than being alone. The mere 
possibility of future regrets never warrants the elimination of marital choice. 
The state could not subject those who want to marry to background checks or 
psychological evaluations, as if they were purchasing a handgun, to identify 
marriages that are more prone to be dysfunctional or are at greater risk of 
failing. There is not a legal limit on how many times people can marry or 
divorce or how many children they may have despite criminal records, 
diagnosed personality disorders or other mental health issues, substance abuse 
 
 90 Id. at 578 (majority opinion). 
 91 Levinson, supra note 2, at 1052. 
 92 See DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS 283 (2012). 
 93 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 66, at 687 (noting that, in order for the government interest to be 
compelling, “[t]he government must have a truly significant reason for discriminating, and it must show that it 
cannot achieve its objective through any less discriminatory alternative”). 
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problems or other addictions, anger management difficulties, a history of 
violence, insolvency, or delinquent child or spousal support obligations. They 
are free to make the same bad choices over and over again. 
A high divorce rate indicates that many couples eventually realize that they 
cannot continue to live together and would prefer to be single or look for 
another partner. Even if they do not divorce, a married couple may stay 
together for the wrong reasons and be anything but happy. Being together for 
fifty years does not necessarily reflect marital bliss. It may reveal risk aversion 
or codependency. Like it or not, with respect to monogamous marriage, as far 
as the state is concerned, adults are left to reap the benefits or to suffer the 
consequences. For the most part, the state pays no attention to its quality. Why, 
then, is marital choice so limited when it comes to marrying more than one 
person at the same time or marrying someone who is already married to 
someone else? The decision to enter into such a marital relationship may turn 
out to be wonderful, terrible, or somewhere in between the two extremes. The 
outcome cannot be predicted without a crystal ball. 
D. The Right to Marriage 
Although the constitutional right to marriage does not appear in the text of 
the Constitution, most scholars do not see that fact as much of an obstacle. 
After all, many important constitutional rights (and powers) are unenumerated, 
and only the most fanatical of textualists would take the opposite view. Several 
well-known Supreme Court decisions take for granted the existence of such a 
right to marriage,94 and disagreement arises with respect to its proper scope in 
particular cases.95 Unlike many other fundamental rights, marriage is a positive 
right that requires the state to accord a legal status.96 Therefore, states can 
decide almost all of its eligibility requirements and determine which financial 
benefits and legal privileges come with it.97 As noted, critics of plural marriage 
have not satisfactorily explained why states may define marriage in a manner 
 
 94 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhall, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (“[T]he right to marry is of fundamental 
importance for all individuals.”); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974) (“This 
Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the 
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 
12 (1967) (“The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the 
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”). 
 95 In discussing the constitutional right to marry, Cass Sunstein draws a useful distinction between its 
content and its scope. See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 2082. 
 96 Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There’s No Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 27, 32 (1996). 
 97 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888). 
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that excludes marital relationships that contain more than two adults. When 
their constitutional opposition rests on legal moralism, tradition, paternalism, 
and the empirically dubious secondary effects of traditional polygyny, they run 
the risk of violating both the letter and the spirit of Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey and Lawrence.98 At present, the idea that a 
particular kind of behavior allegedly corrupts public morals or causes others 
distress but does not directly harm them is unlikely to rise to the level of an 
important or compelling interest, which a heightened standard of review would 
require. Even if there were a better philosophical rationale for denying people 
the opportunity to marry more than one person at the same time, it still is hard 
to visualize how such a rationale could be squared with existing constitutional 
doctrine and cases that unequivocally put the burden of proof on the state to 
show why the personal choice in question should not be allowed. The more 
important the choice, the more compelling the state’s rationale must be to deny 
that choice. 
If questioned, few scholars, judges, and lawyers would doubt the existence 
of the fundamental right to marry, even though it does not appear in the 
constitutional text or comport with original public meaning, understood as the 
framers’ intent or original expected applications. However, that does not mean 
that they agree on which restrictions are allowed.99 Those who are against the 
extension of the fundamental right to marriage must necessarily be of the 
mindset that most plural marriages are much worse than their monogamous 
counterparts. The response to this objection is simple: if traditional 
monogamous marriages were inherently unequal, frequently involved less than 
fully autonomous choices, or were deeply dysfunctional, states still would not 
prohibit them to save the couple from their own bad judgment. To do so would 
unarguably violate their right to marital choice.100 
At minimum, the state’s refusal to expand the coverage of the constitutional 
right of marriage to plural marriage enthusiasts has to be defended more 
vigorously than it has been in the past. In Loving v. Virginia, Chief Justice 
Warren articulated the importance of a person’s being able to choose his or her 
 
 98 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992). 
 99 See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (declaring laws that prevent prisoners from marrying 
are unconstitutional); Zablocki, 434 U.S. 374 (declaring laws that prohibit those who are delinquent on their 
child support payments from remarrying are unconstitutional); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) 
(declaring laws that require unreasonably high filing fees and court costs to divorce are unconstitutional); 
Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (declaring laws that ban interracial marriages are unconstitutional).  
 100 See Calhoun, supra note 29, at 1040–41. 
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spouse.101 In the context of the debate over same-sex marriage, though, each 
side tends to interpret the holding narrowly or broadly in the service of their 
desired constitutional conclusion. Loving could represent the constitutional 
principle that the state cannot act on the basis of racist reasons to limit 
marriage to same-race couples.102 However, its holding could be construed to 
incorporate a broader constitutional principle of marital nondiscrimination and 
include all classifications in which judges do not simply defer to the state’s 
eligibility requirements. In other words, the state must have adequate reasons 
for treating some persons differently than others when it refuses to give only 
some persons the right to marry the person that they want to marry. In 2015, 
few people think that bans on interracial marriage are unproblematic simply 
because a person could always marry another person from his or her own racial 
group. 
V. EQUAL PROTECTION 
A. Background 
The relationship between the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses is 
complicated and beyond the scope of this Article. However, to render 
American constitutional doctrine, case law, and practice as coherent as 
possible, it makes sense to conceptualize one of its main normative purposes as 
respecting the freedom and equality of all of American citizens. In legal 
literature, this is known as a public justification requirement.103 If the 
Constitution incorporates such a requirement, or something like it, then laws 
that do not permit competent adults to marry multiple partners are at minimum 
constitutionally questionable. In equal protection cases, judges do not ask why 
the state may try to prevent everyone from behaving in certain ways. 
Alternatively, they decide whether the state may treat one group of people 
more or less favorably and, therefore, deny them a benefit when others already 
enjoy it. A law that only allows persons over a certain age to consume alcohol, 
 
 101 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
 102 The Virginia Supreme Court had found that the state’s purposes of preserving “the racial integrity of 
its citizens” and preventing “the corruption of blood” were legitimate. As Warren pointed out, these reasons 
are an “endorsement of the doctrine of White Supremacy.” Id. at 7. 
 103 In POLITICAL LIBERALISM, Rawls referred to the U.S. Supreme Court as “exemplar of public reason.” 
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 231 (expanded ed. 2005); see also John Rawls, The Ideal of Public 
Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 768, 786 (1997). Lawrence Solum was the first legal scholar to begin 
to develop the place of public reason in law and legal reasoning. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Pluralism and 
Public Legal Reason, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 7 (2006).  
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for instance, would be constitutional if judges accept the state’s reasons under 
the appropriate standard of review. The higher the applicable standard of 
review, the better those reasons must be for the challenged law to pass muster. 
In equal protection cases, then, a state may treat certain groups differently 
as long as it can successfully defend such treatment. The fundamental question 
in such cases concerns whether the legislative classification in question is 
“justified by a sufficient purpose.”104 For a heightened standard of review, such 
as strict or intermediate scrutiny, judges assess the reasons that the state 
advances on behalf of the legislative classification at issue with a presumption 
that they are unsatisfactory.105 When it comes to marriage, those state interests 
cannot be the promotion of white supremacy.106 It has become increasingly 
evident that states are not on firm constitutional ground inasmuch as refusal to 
allow same-sex couples to marry is based on animus against gays and lesbians 
or heteronormativity. More generally, if lawmakers invidiously discriminate 
against sexual minorities, then judges may apply something more like a 
heightened standard of review by not deferring to what lawmakers have 
decided to do. Laws that do not treat same-sex couples equally imply their 
inferiority.107 While Lawrence is not technically an equal protection case, it is 
pertinent to the question of when, if ever, states may treat sexual minorities 
differently.108 In that case, by not repealing such a law, Texas was 
substantiating their status as second-class citizens. 
As this Part will try to show, equal protection analysis leads to the 
conclusion that laws that fail to allow plural marriage enthusiasts to have the 
kind of intimate relationship that they want violate the Constitution. 
Restrictions based on sexual orientation are no longer nearly as easy to defend 
as they once were, and many judges doubt that state interests suffice to 
override unequal legal treatment with respect to marriage licenses. In Romer v. 
Evans, the Court found that animus against gays and lesbians fails to rise to the 
level of a legitimate state interest.109 Perry v. Schwarzenegger and Perry v. 
Brown call into question the quality of the state’s reasoning for not allowing 
gays and lesbians to marry.110 The Court decided Hollingsworth on procedural 
 
 104 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 66, at 685. 
 105 Id. at 687. 
 106 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 7. 
 107 See John Corvino, Homosexuality and the PIB Argument, 115 ETHICS 501, 509 (2005). 
 108 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 109 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 110 See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. 
Ct. 2652 (2013); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
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grounds, but in doing so it reaffirmed the lower federal courts’ decisions to 
invalidate Proposition 8.111 The dignity language of Windsor raises the 
question of whether any state that refuses to let a man marry another man or a 
woman marry another woman is acting constitutionally.112 This decision could 
stand for the view that legally there is no meaningful difference between those 
who are straight and those who are not.113 Many lower federal courts are 
reading Windsor in a manner that underscores its dignity language and 
connects it to the right to marriage.114 
The inappropriateness of using sexual orientation as the basis of a 
legislative classification also may undermine confidence in the belief that 
numerical restrictions are constitutionally allowable. This is how the courts 
may connect the dots. When a judge invalidates a particular legislative 
classification on equal protection grounds, he or she thinks not only that one 
group is being discriminated against but also that the state lacks a sufficient 
interest in such discriminatory treatment. By their very nature, legislative 
classifications treat different people differently. If the Equal Protection Clause 
requires identical treatment in all situations, then the state never could make 
any legal classifications, no matter how warranted. Alternatively, judges also 
have come around to the view the reasons the state has offered on behalf of the 
law do not justify the unequal treatment in question.115 The application of a 
heightened standard of review, more generally, in some equal protection cases 
reflects the worry that the state probably is acting on the basis of the wrong 
reasons.116 Even if only rational basis is triggered, the legislative classification 
cannot be rooted in animus against a politically unpopular group.117 The state 
may not make distinctions under the Equal Protection Clause without sufficient 
justification. The more that states’ reasons for imposing numerical restrictions 
 
 111 Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. 2652. 
 112 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2710 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 113 Id. at 2696 (majority opinion). 
 114 William Peacock, One Year After Windsor: The State of Same-Sex Marriage, FINDLAW (June 26, 
2014, 2:48 PM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/strategist/2014/06/one-year-after-windsor-the-state-of-same-sex-
marriage.html. 
 115 One of the most recent, impressive, and innovative approaches to understanding equal protection 
jurisprudence in terms of public reasons is found in the work by BEDI, supra note 11. 
 116 See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1564–65 (noting that the Supreme Court’s application of intermediate 
scrutiny to gender discrimination reflected the Court’s low tolerance for “legislative classifications than 
presume that women have no responsibilities outside the home”). 
 117 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 
473 U.S. 472, 446–47 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–17 (1982); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 
413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). 
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resemble those for not permitting persons of the same gender to marry each 
other, the more constitutionally suspect such laws are. 
B. The Analogy 
Although the interdisciplinary literature on same-sex marriage and the 
family generally is voluminous, little has been written about plural marriage 
and other unconventional forms of marriage, like asexual or incestuous 
(between or among consenting adults).118 This oversight reflects the fact that 
the same-sex marriage battle is not over and that opponents of same-sex 
marriage use slippery slope arguments indiscriminately to discredit such 
marriage.119 The result is that plural marriage is not discussed with the kind of 
care that it warrants. The same-sex marriage debate suggests that more 
Americans are becoming accustomed to the idea that intimacy does not have to 
be opposite sex. Even those who continue to reject the legal recognition of a 
marriage between a man and another man or a woman and another woman 
probably concede that two men or women could love each other even when 
they cannot reproduce without the aid of technology. If love can be same sex, 
then it is not unreasonable to believe that there can also be “big love,” so to 
speak. For progressives, the reasons that conservatives deploy to support their 
opposition to same-sex marriage fall short. At the same time, many 
progressives overlook or downplay the extent to which the main reasons for 
supporting same-sex marriage (such as personal choice and equal legal 
treatment) can be used to defend the legal recognition of plural marriage. 
The slope from one kind of marriage to the other may be slippery.120 An 
individual who denies their constitutional similarity will not only have to 
establish that the two kinds of marriage are not the same in relevant ways but 
also that the state may treat them differently without acting unconstitutionally. 
As this Article emphasizes, a plural marriage could take a variety of forms; it 
 
 118 For a brief discussion of incestuous marriage, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 149–51 (1996). For a nuanced 
defense of its adult form, see Andrew F. March, What Lies Beyond Same-Sex Marriage? Marriage, 
Reproductive Freedom and Future Persons in Liberal Public Justification, 27 J. APPLIED PHIL. 39, 42–45 
(2010). 
 119 E.g., Stanley Kurtz, The Libertarian Question: Incest, Homosexuality, and Adultery, in SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE: THE MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 263, 263, 268 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 
2d ed. 2004) (arguing that same-sex marriage would “set in motion a series of threats to the ethos of 
monogamy” and remove the societal “taboos” associated with incest and adultery). 
 120 See Kent Greenfield, The Slippery Slope to Polygamy and Incest, AM. PROSPECT (July 15, 2013), 
http://prospect.org/article/slippery-slope-polygamy-and-incest. 
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could be same sex, bisexual, or asexual and is not synonymous with the most 
troubling features of patriarchal polygynous relationships. Critics like to pull a 
bait and switch. When discussing legal recognition of plural marriage, critics 
cite polygynous marriages in undeveloped nations with dramatically different 
background conditions as if only two options exist—prohibition or an 
“anything goes” alternative with no administrative oversight whatsoever. That 
is a false choice when the state could regulate such marriages to minimize 
exploitation and other harms. 
The same-sex marriage debate is instructive because it is not just about 
whether states are acting unconstitutionally when they deny same-sex couples 
marriage licenses. It is also about the meaning of the “m” word under 
conditions of moral pluralism, how the state should be involved in the 
institution, how Americans should interpret marital equality, and when, if ever, 
the marital choice of competent adults ought to be limited. Oddly enough, 
recent arguments in defense of same-sex marriage have a noticeably 
conservative dimension: those who defend it, in the name of marital equality, 
are determined to show that legal recognition will reinforce the traditional 
understanding of marriage in which two, and no more than two, persons are 
committed to each other in a long-term, sexually exclusive relationship. The 
gender of each person in the dyad is neither here nor there. That strategy, while 
shrewd, has the unintended consequence of perpetuating “amatonormativity,” 
the unjustified favoring of sexual dyads at the expense of other equally 
worthwhile intimate relationships.121 
C. Similarities and Differences 
Amatonormativity resembles heteronormativity in several respects. For 
example, both of them can emerge from a fear or intolerance of difference. Just 
as gays and lesbians have been the “other” in a society like our own in which 
straight persons constitute a majority and being straight is considered normal, 
these days polygamists often serve as a stand-in for sexual deviance, even 
when they are heterosexual. In terms of the granting of marriage licenses, race 
is and sexual orientation (gender) should be legally irrelevant. At the time of 
this Article’s publication, only thirteen states continue to exclude same-sex 
couples from the institution.122 Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a 
 
 121 Elizabeth Brake coined this term in MINIMIZING MARRIAGE: MARRIAGE, MORALITY, AND THE LAW 5 
(2012). 
 122 Marriage Center, supra note 3 (including Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas). 
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petition for a writ of certiorari in several cases involving such states.123 The 
issue of same-sex marriage implicates multi-person intimate relationships 
inasmuch as the legal definition of marriage may fail to be sufficiently 
inclusive. Some scholars believe that the debates over same-sex and plural 
marriage are not analogous.124 After all, one could believe they are different in 
at least two relevant ways. First, linking them may be a misguided political 
strategy.125 Second, the reasons that do not warrant treating same-sex couples 
differently than their opposite-sex counterparts nevertheless may justify 
treating multi-person intimate relationships differently. Unfortunately, too 
many progressives are too eager to differentiate same-sex from plural marriage 
so that they can establish a constitutional right to the former without proving 
too much and thereby also making room for a right to the latter. During the 
hearings that preceded the passage of the DOMA, some of those who testified 
equated polygamy with same-sex marriage.126 
D. The Slippery Slope 
It is far from obvious, then, that same-sex and plural marriage are morally 
or legally equivalent. A restriction based on sexual orientation may not be 
sufficiently similar to a numerical restriction. A fair number of defenders of 
same-sex marriage “go to great lengths” to deny the equivalence between 
same-sex and plural marriage.127 Some of them insist that the legal recognition 
of same-sex marriage will not necessarily precipitate the advent of the legal 
recognition of plural marriage.128 For them, anyone who seeks to marry more 
than one person at the same time can at least marry one person that he or she 
loves. Their motivation for this response is not hard to grasp when one 
considers that traditionalists never tire of making the slope between the two 
types of marriage as slippery as possible.129 In his dissent in Lawrence, Justice 
 
 123 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039, 1040 (2015) (mem.). 
 124 See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Glazer, Sodomy and Polygamy, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 66, 71 (2011). 
 125 Jaime M. Gher, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage—Allies or Adversaries Within the Same-Sex 
Marriage Movement, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 559, 602 (2008). 
 126 Chambers, supra note 32, at 53. 
 127 Andrew F. March, Is There a Right to Polygamy? Marriage, Equality and Subsidizing Families in 
Liberal Public Justification, 8 J. MORAL PHIL. 246, 247 (2011). 
 128 See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 118, at 148–49; EVAN GERSTMANN, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 104 (2d ed. 2008); JONATHAN RAUCH, GAY MARRIAGE: WHY IT IS GOOD FOR GAYS, GOOD 
FOR STRAIGHTS, AND GOOD FOR AMERICA 123–37 (2004); Jonathan Rauch, Marrying Somebody, in SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON 285, 286 (Andrew Sullivan ed., rev. ed. 2004); Andrew Sullivan, Three’s a Crowd, 
in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON, supra, at 278, 279.  
 129 See, e.g., Kurtz, supra note 119, at 263, 266. 
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Scalia stated that the decriminalization of laws against same-sex sex set a 
dangerous precedent.130 A few of these slippery-slope fears are absurd: Just 
because a man can marry another man, or a woman can marry another woman, 
does not mean that a person can marry a toaster. No empirical evidence comes 
close to proving that the legal recognition of same-sex marriage must 
culminate in the legal recognition of all conceivable kinds of marriage.131 
Children cannot legally consent to a marriage contract, and neither can animals 
or inanimate objects. The vast majority of slippery-slope arguments incorrectly 
assume that no one in the future could draw a principled distinction between 
these two scenarios from those involving consenting adults. 
That said, several slippery-slope arguments are not as ridiculous as most of 
them. In redefining marriage to include same-sex couples, lawmakers and 
judges are setting a precedent of willingness to entertain a new definition of 
marriage that is more inclusive, which an increasing number of Americans are 
coming to believe is more just. The main reasons that support compelling 
states to accord legal status to same-sex marriages (such as personal choice and 
equal legal treatment) reach plural marriages as well.132 A conscientious person 
concerns herself with combating all kinds of unjustified legal discrimination, 
even when she has not directly suffered from the discrimination in question. 
Normally, to fully comprehend the harm of being marginalized is to empathize 
with the victims. According to Pro-Polygamy.com, plural marriage is “the next 
civil rights battle.”133 Even if that statement is over the top, a good point can 
stand to be overstated. It is not ridiculous to believe that discrimination against 
plural marriage enthusiasts may be caused more by prejudice than anything 
else and that such discrimination, which is unnecessary, diminishes their lives. 
Part of the effort on the part of polyamorists to convince the public to become 
less hostile to their cause has been to highlight the similarities between plural 
marriage and same-sex marriage.134 Those who take this approach hope that 
eventually more Americans will begin to acquiesce to the phenomenon of 
same-sex marriages and then question the rationale for numerical restrictions. 
 
 130 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 131 See Judith Stacey & Tey Meadow, New Slants on the Slippery Slope: The Politics of Polygamy and 
Gay Family Rights in South Africa and the United States, 37 POL. & SOC’Y 167, 190–92 (2009). 
 132 BRAKE, supra note 121, at 198; March, supra note 127. 
 133 PRO-POLYGAMY.COM, http://www.Pro-Polygamy.com (last visited May 17, 2015). 
 134 Jeffrey Michael Hayes, Comment, Polygamy Comes Out of the Closet: The New Strategy of Polygamy 
Activists, 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 99, 104–05 (2007). 
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Slippery-slope arguments stem from the belief that no logical stopping 
point exists in a particular context. Their force tends to come less from their 
soundness and more from the probability that people will fail to distinguish 
between the two things in question. In the case of plural marriage, a right to 
such marriage may follow from a right to same-sex marriage if same-sex 
marriage serves as a precedent for redefining marriage. Just imagine that in a 
Supreme Court’s majority opinion concluding that states must allow same-sex 
couples to marry, the Court includes broad language that provides some 
support for the view that the state must cease to discriminate against plural 
marriage enthusiasts. In contemporary America, the distance between the legal 
recognition of opposite-sex and same-sex monogamous marriage is not nearly 
as wide as it used to be. While the same cannot be said about the distance 
between monogamous and plural marriage, times may change, and the public 
may come to see the two kinds of marriage as not so different. Over time, more 
Americans may care less about the structure of a marriage and more about its 
interpersonal dynamics. Few of them see a four-person family and a ten-person 
family as being so dramatically different due to their numbers that they warrant 
different legal treatment. If the public’s attitude changes, then the 
constitutional principle of nondiscrimination could lead to the constitutional 
conclusion that marriage cannot be limited to couples. In 1967, no one 
anticipated that one day Loving would be enlisted to support the cause of 
marriage equality for gays and lesbians. The creative use of an old case in new 
circumstances never can be ruled out because of the uncertainty of the future. 
For constitutional purposes, a principled distinction between same-sex and 
plural marriage may be hard to maintain. The right to marry someone at all is 
not exactly the same, in every respect, as the right to marry multiple persons. 
Some commentators insist that “[t]he gay situation is unique.”135 That is true, 
as this Article concedes, but the implication is not that the situation of plural 
marriage enthusiasts, whether gay, straight, bisexual, or transgender, is fine. 
Requesting the right to marry more than one person simultaneously is no more 
trivial than wanting to have more than one close friend or child, unless one is 
in the thrall of the view that a person could not possibly love or care for more 
than one person at the same time. That view is demonstrably false. Whether 
her desire for a nonmonogamous marital arrangement is frivolous is a function 
of the quality of the personal reasons for wanting such an arrangement. The 
quality of these reasons is subjective in the sense that whether they are good or 
bad reflects on his or her priorities. A considerable number of people want to 
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be able to structure their personal lives in a manner that maximizes their 
chances of achieving their ends, whatever those ends happen to be. Americans 
do not have to decide which kind of discrimination is worse. The rights of all 
polygamists should not be cast away as if they do not matter. From a 
constitutional perspective, the lives of all persons—including all sexual 
minorities—count equally. 
E. Standards of Review 
The Equal Protection Clause mandates that legislative classifications must 
be sufficiently publicly justified.136 When a heightened standard of review is 
applicable, the court is probably going to find the law being evaluated to be 
unconstitutional. In Gerald Gunther’s famous words, strict scrutiny is “‘strict’ 
in theory and fatal in fact.”137 According to Sonu Bedi, “[W]hether a group 
counts as a suspect class makes all of the constitutional difference in the 
world.”138 Doctrinally, only suspect classes receive extra judicial protection, 
which is to say that almost all legislative classifications only trigger rational 
basis standard of review and, thus, are likely to be found to be constitutional.139 
The rationale for such extra protection comes from the imperative of protecting 
“discrete and insular minorities.”140 In deciding whether a particular group 
constitutes a suspect or quasi-suspect class, the three criteria are: an immutable 
or fixed characteristic, political powerlessness, and history of discrimination.141 
A growing number of judges believe that gays and lesbians meet these 
criteria.142 
As the first part of this Article attempted to establish, the strength of the 
main state interests against plural marriage—ensuring gender equality and 
 
 136 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 66, at 685. 
 137 Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a 
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 138 BEDI, supra note 11, at 2. 
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promoting the welfare of children—are weak. The promotion of internal 
equality is not important or compelling in the constitutional sense of the terms. 
If it were, then one would expect that the state would scrutinize two-person 
marriages much more closely. In terms of such equality, the best polyamorous 
marriage would be much better than the worst opposite-sex, monogamous one. 
If the state is to defend the double standard with a greater chance of success, it 
must be able to demonstrate that plural marriages—and not just some 
polygynous ones—are inherently dysfunctional and that, as a consequence, the 
state may restrict marital choice even when a fully informed, competent adult 
agrees to a multi-person marital arrangement. As noted, the argument from 
gender inequality assumes that most legally recognized plural marriages would 
be one male and multiple women, but that assumption needs to be backed up 
by a better argument. If the state began to accord legal status to a much wider 
range of intimate relationships, then women would have more options to 
choose from, like an all-female plural marriage or an asexual monogamous 
one. It is virtually impossible to know ahead of time what kinds of marriages 
people would select if they had true marital freedom. More likely than not, 
individual plural marriages would be as diverse, with respect to their 
interpersonal dynamics, as the monogamous ones that Americans tend to 
romanticize. 
Polygamists or plural marriage enthusiasts could be treated as a suspect 
class under existing constitutional doctrine. Constitutionally, if plural marriage 
enthusiasts qualify as such a class, then the burden of proof falls on the state to 
show that it has a substantial or a compelling interest in defining marriage to 
exclude multi-person relationships and why the legislative means that it has 
chosen directly advance that interest. Such enthusiasts meet at least two of the 
three traditional criteria—immutability, a history of discrimination, and 
political powerlessness—for extending additional judicial protection in the 
form of a heightened standard of review. The criteria “are indicia, not 
necessary conditions.”143 Therefore, not all three of them have to be met before 
one can conclude that the group qualifies as a suspect or quasi-suspect class. 
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1. Immutability 
The standard interpretation of immutability is that the trait in question is 
unchangeable and, thus, one is not responsible for it.144 Because one cannot 
choose one’s race or sex, it would be unfair to discriminate against someone 
for something that is beyond her control. However, that line of analysis 
encounters the inherent philosophical difficulty of knowing what it means to 
choose something, like a religion. Anyone could be asked to change her 
deepest religious convictions and convert to the religion of the majority. The 
point is not that she could not possibly do so or that it would be hard for her to 
adopt a different belief system. Rather, it would be wrong to ask her to do so in 
a society, like ours, that tries to protect freedom of conscience. Whether chosen 
or not, certain beliefs and the practices that follow from one’s belief system are 
central to that person’s identity. Many religious people cannot imagine 
themselves as not being a Christian, Jew, Muslim, Hindu, or Buddhist. That is 
not to say that they have not made any sort of choice or could not possibly 
have done otherwise. Rather, it is beside the constitutional point. Similarly, to 
refer to her desire to marry more than one person as a whim or preference is to 
beg the question against its significance in her life. Not being allowed to marry 
at least one person would strike most Americans as a serious injustice. In the 
abstract, they appreciate why such a right should not be infringed upon. The 
issue is less about whether an identity is chosen, and thus could be rejected, 
and more about the unfairness of being disadvantaged because of who she is 
and how she wants her life to be. 
At the end of the day, it should not matter whether a particular identity is 
fixed in the sense that one could not change it even if one desired such a 
change. What is crucial is the respect, or at least tolerance, that the person is 
entitled to under the Constitution unless it harms others or unreasonably puts 
them at risk. The problem with the way in which immutability is usually 
conceptualized is that such an approach does not capture the rationale of the 
immutability requirement—namely that there is nothing wrong with being a 
racial minority, female, or gay. As an example, even if a gay man could alter 
his sexual orientation and corresponding identity through therapy or 
medication, he should not have to do so any more than an atheist should try to 
accept divine entities. Although polygamists are not born that way, being 
“poly” is a crucial part of many of their identities, and having a multi-person, 
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intimate relationship is morally permissible. It is also critical to keep in mind 
that being polygamist or polyamorous is not the same as wanting to have sex 
indiscriminately or swing. That characterization—the lifestyle is all about 
sex—impairs monogamists’ willingness to take multi-person, intimate 
relationships seriously and evaluate the possible advantages. In lumping all of 
them together and sexualizing them, critics are trying to delegitimize them. To 
assert that marital multiplicity amounts to either behavior is overlooking the 
serious personal reasons that religious and nonreligious people may have for 
preferring a nonmonogamous arrangement. Even if being poly were not an 
immutable characteristic in the traditional sense of the term, it still may be 
appropriate to treat it as a sexual orientation for purposes of antidiscrimination 
law.145 
2. Political Powerlessness 
The purpose of this criterion is to try to prevent legislative majorities from 
invidiously discriminating against minority groups that cannot defend 
themselves in the legislative process. In “Federalist No. 10,” James Madison 
not only warns against the dangers of faction but defends a larger republic as 
the most promising solution to the problem.146 Very much like 
balance-of-power arrangements in realist international-relations theory, the 
thought is that no faction will grow too powerful when other factions, out of 
self-interest, form coalitions to prevent any faction from achieving hegemony. 
Despite Madison’s remarkable insights and the extension of the right to vote to 
previously disenfranchised groups over time, it is still possible for legislative 
minorities to be dominated repeatedly in the legislative process. Lani Gunier’s 
theory of fairness in political representation is designed to give each group 
greater influence over the outcomes that matter most to them.147 
Because such changes are not forthcoming, notwithstanding their merits, it 
seems that the only other plausible alternative is to invite courts to intervene to 
prevent legislative majorities from exceeding their constitutional authority. 
One way, then, to construe the meaning of “political powerlessness” is to ask 
when a particular group has been or is likely to be targeted and needs 
additional protection in the form of judicial intervention. Historically, the U.S. 
 
 145 See BEDI, supra note 11, at 208–47; Ann E. Tweedy, Polyamory as a Sexual Orientation, 79 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1461 (2011). 
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Supreme Court’s record of riding to the rescue has been far from impressive. 
Under some circumstances, though, a federal court may be able to veto the 
discriminatory legislation in question when it is produced by constitutionally 
impermissible reasons. In his dissent in Romer, Justice Scalia notoriously 
overstated the political influence of gays and lesbians.148 If they have so much 
influence, then it is hard to explain why about one-fourth of the states, as of 
this writing, still do not allow same-sex couples to marry.149 Some of them fail 
to protect sexual minorities from different sorts of discrimination for which 
racial minorities and women have legal remedies.150 During the trial in Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, expert witness Gary Segura testified that gays and lesbians 
are usually unable to combat the discrimination that they face through political 
measures.151 At best, due to demographics, they may have enough political 
power proportional to their numbers in a few places. By comparison, 
polygamists have even fewer resources. As Eugene Volokh puts it, 
“pro-polygamy forces are in a lousy political position.”152 Given the nature of 
contemporary public opinion, it may be even easier for a gay or lesbian 
individual to out himself or herself than for a straight polygamist or 
polyamorist to do so. Even today, almost all Americans would agree that 
allowing a competent, fully informed adult marry more than one person 
simultaneously is not permissible.153 
3. History of Discrimination 
The other traditional criterion for treating a minority group as a suspect 
class is a history of discrimination. Again, the logic of this criterion is not hard 
to grasp. That a minority group has been victimized over an extended period 
indicates that lawmakers have not lived up to their constitutional duty to ensure 
that the Constitution works for everyone. That gays and lesbians in this country 
have been the victims of pervasive discrimination by the state and private 
actors is beyond dispute. As noted, it is not productive to make comparative 
 
 148 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 645–46 (1996). 
 149 Marriage Center, supra note 3. 
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judgments as if all that matters is which minority group has suffered more than 
others. The problem of mistreatment of those who are different probably 
characterizes all human societies at all times in all places to a greater or lesser 
extent. 
Certain kinds of differences seem to trigger stronger public reactions than 
others do. Religious minorities often fall into this category, even in a nation 
like the United States that is morally, politically, and constitutionally 
committed to the free exercise of religion. The most well-known free exercise 
cases involve such minorities.154 Mormons (LDS), and especially 
Fundamentalist Latter-day Saints (FLDS), have been demonized for their 
religious convictions and behaviors.155 FLDS still can be prosecuted for some 
of their religiously motivated polygynous practices, and that reality 
demonstrates that they continue to experience the sort of stereotyping that 
dehumanizes the other. Psychologically, it is probably asking a lot of anyone to 
hate the sin and love the sinner—to separate behavior they are convinced in 
morally reprehensible from the person who behaves in that way. As in the past, 
many Americans still associate plural marriage with Mormonism.156 The 
persecution of Mormons for unconventional marital arrangements should not 
be papered over on the assumption that it obviously pales in comparison to 
what racial and sexual minorities and women have gone through and, 
consequently, merits no concern. In the antebellum period, the Republican 
Party dubbed polygamy and slavery the “twin relics of barbarism.”157 In 1852, 
the same year that it officially endorsed polygamy, Utah legalized slavery.158 
Private actors also persecuted Mormons.159 Recently, some journalistic 
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accounts of FLDS fundamentalism have portrayed its polygynous practices in 
the worst possible light.160 
F. The Long Shadow of Reynolds 
A number of times, the judiciary has substantiated the popular belief that 
FLDS polygynous marriage is nothing but an opportunity to harm women and 
children. In Reynolds, the Court decided that the Free Exercise Clause does not 
protect the practice of plural marriage.161 In his majority opinion, Chief Justice 
Morrison Waite conceded that the practice of plural marriage was rooted in 
sincere religious convictions but concluded that only beliefs—and not 
religiously motivated actions—were constitutionally protected.162 More than a 
century has passed and the Court still has not overturned Reynolds.163 
Nevertheless, the language of Reynolds—that plural marriage is contrary to 
“social duties” and “good order,” and “odious among the northern and western 
nations of Europe”—should not be minimized in a morally pluralistic society 
that is not supposed to be imposing the sentiments of the majority on those 
who refuse to conform.164 As one scholar writes, “The Reynolds [C]ourt both 
drew upon and reinforced [a] discourse of racial and cultural superiority of 
whites over others, casting the American-born Mormon religion as foreign and 
other.”165 
This is neither the time nor the place to offer anything like a comprehensive 
explanation of the multiple historical causes of anti-polygamist propaganda, 
but concerns about racism and religious bigotry should not be dismissed out of 
hand. A handful of scholars have argued that polygyny constitutes a solution to 
the problem of the lack of marriageable men in certain African-American 
communities.166 More recently, opposition to polygyny may be driven by 
anti-Muslim feelings as well.167 The Qur’an allows a man to marry as many as 
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four wives, subject to certain conditions, but does not make it a religious 
duty.168 Some advocates of plural marriage remind us that such marriage may 
not differ from serial monogamy or habitual infidelity. In the West, without 
question, anti-polygamy sentiments are found in the Christian tradition, which 
privileges opposite-sex monogamy.169 By 1000 C.E., the practice of polygamy 
in Jewish communities was uncommon.170 
Beyond marital relationships and their structure, composition, and 
dynamics, Americans seem to be preoccupied with sexual behavior and often 
condemn unconventional kinds of sexual behavior without making any effort 
to understand them. According to Nussbaum, “Americans characteristically 
exhibit a lot of anxiety about sexual variety.”171 In trying to discredit same-sex 
marriage, conservatives used to rely upon the so-called “unnaturalness” of 
same-sex intimate relationships and focused on their sexual aspects, as if 
everything else were secondary. No one ever seems to oppose same-sex 
marriage on the basis of the wrongfulness of two men having an emotionally 
close friendship. Indeed, films like Sideways and television programs like 
Entourage celebrate male friendship. If any of the characters were physically 
intimate with each other, then many viewers would react differently because 
they would see its content as being salacious. Men can be as close as the 
closest brothers and hug each other after winning a game. However, the 
moment that they engage in sex acts, what was admirable immediately 
becomes debased in the eyes of the viewers. 
In this sense, opposition to polygamy has something in common with 
opposition to homosexuality. In his dissent in Romer, Scalia favorably 
compared laws that discriminate against gays and lesbians with those that do 
likewise to polygamists.172 For many Americans, same-sex sex acts are 
considered deviant. In Nussbaum’s view, “appeal to disgust . . . has been a 
crucial part of the antigay strategy.”173 Likewise, most of them frown upon 
have multiple sexual partners, and sexual non-exclusivity is one of the defining 
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features of some polygamous unions.174 For one political theorist, “[t]he 
restriction on polygamy may instead be a case in which allegations of social 
instability are used to suppress an unpopular minority whose actions are seen 
as morally indecent or corrupt.”175 Another scholar has come up with the term 
“polyphobia” to describe prejudice against polygamists and their 
relationships.176 The topic of sex makes many Americans uncomfortable.177 
They may feel even more uncomfortable with alternative lifestyles that involve 
unfamiliar sexual behaviors and threaten well-entrenched norms like 
monogamy. Although very few people in this country still believe adultery or 
divorce should be illegal, most of them are quick to condemn cheating on 
one’s partner, and mere allegations of such behavior on the part of public 
figures are always newsworthy. This moral reaction is understandable due to 
the deception that infidelity usually involves and the trauma that it causes, yet 
such a reaction usually leaves no room for public discussion about whether the 
couple has an open marriage or whether having more than one long-term 
intimate partner might work better for some persons in some circumstances. 
Before Bowers was overturned in 2003,178 it would have been considerably 
harder to put together a plausible constitutional argument to support same-sex 
marriage. Most contemporary legal academics would place Bowers v. 
Hardwick in the category of other notorious decisions like Dred Scott, Plessy 
v. Ferguson, and Korematsu.179 Pre-Lawrence, it was not evident whether a 
state’s unwillingness to accord legal status to a same-sex marriage would 
trigger the analysis found in Bowers or that of Romer, in which the Court held 
that animus against gays and lesbians could not qualify as a legitimate state 
interest to satisfy the first part of rational basis standard of review.180 In his 
dissent in Romer, Justice Scalia chides the justices in the majority for taking a 
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constitutional position that ignores the precedential value of Bowers.181 
Fortunately, since 1996, the legal community is not as hostile to the rights of 
sexual minorities as it used to be in the sense that lawmakers and private actors 
no longer can discriminate against them with impunity. As Andrew 
Koppelman writes, “Together, Lawrence and Romer establish a fairly clear 
rule: If a law singles out gays for unprecedentedly harsh treatment, the Court 
will presume that what is going on is a bare desire to harm, rather than mere 
moral disapproval.”182 
Nevertheless, polygamists still can be prosecuted for in essence doing what 
straight and gay married and unmarried people can do without fear of incurring 
criminal liability. Because they could lose their families, friends, jobs, and 
even their children in a custody dispute, many polygamists and polyamorists 
are frightened to come out of the closet.183 In some jurisdictions, they could 
face criminal charges.184 There are many traumatic life experiences that human 
beings may have to go through, but one of them, which ought to be near the 
top of the list, concerns the burden of having to hide who one is for fear of how 
others will react if they knew the truth. This point would not be lost on anyone 
who is a sexual minority in America and feels like she has to live a double life. 
The constitutional importance of Romer cannot be underestimated because, 
like many important constitutional cases, it can be read narrowly or broadly. 
The decision could stand for the proposition that the judges must be more 
skeptical of the rationale advanced by the state in defense of a legislative 
classification whose constitutionality is being disputed. Of course, when a 
suspect group is being put at a legal disadvantage, it may be difficult to 
ascertain whether the intent that underlies the law in question is invidious. 
The principal disagreement between Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia in 
Romer centered on how to describe properly why the voters of Colorado had 
approved Amendment 2: that is, whether the voters where driven by animus 
against gays and lesbians. This disagreement resurfaces in Windsor. In his 
dissent in Windsor, Justice Scalia complains about the implication of the 
majority opinion that he and others like him who continue to oppose same-sex 
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marriage are bigots.185 That complaint would have merit if it were legitimate to 
(a) morally disapprove of same-sex relationships in the first place, and 
(b) express that disapproval in law by doing what Amendment 2 did by 
functioning as an anti-antidiscrimination measure in not only taking away the 
protection of local ordinances but also making it considerably more difficult 
for such measures to be enacted in the future. Many opponents of same-sex 
marriage have not stopped endeavoring to preserve what they see as the 
traditional meaning of marriage and sincerely believe that the redefinition of 
marriage will produce adverse consequences. If that is the case, irrespective of 
whether marriage is deinstitutionalized as a growing number of states allow 
gays and lesbians to marry their partners, then not everyone who opposes 
same-sex marriage could be automatically labeled a homophobe. Perhaps not 
every voter in California who voted for Proposition 8 in 2008 had homophobic 
reasons for doing so. Andrew Koppelman asserts that “more recent legislative 
initiatives . . . do not necessarily reflect a desire to harm gay people as such, or 
even a disrespectful devaluation of their interests.”186 By contrast, during the 
trial in Perry, Judge Vaugh Walker was less generous in questioning the 
strength of the state’s interests. Whether one gives those who voted for either 
Amendment 2 or Proposition 8 the benefit of the doubt with respect to the 
constitutional legitimacy of their individual reasons for voting the way that 
they did comes down to the considerations that are most relevant and have the 
most weight, and reasonable persons might differ about their relevance and 
weight. Even if same-sex sex acts and relationships can legitimately be morally 
disapproved of, in not redefining marriage to include same-sex couples, such 
couples are asked to pay the costs of preserving a particular conception of 
marriage. 
Anyone who wants to maintain the symbolic meaning of monogamous, 
opposite-sex marriage by excluding gays and lesbians from the institution is 
demanding that they make a considerable sacrifice that he or she probably 
would not be willing to make himself or herself. After all, there are numerous 
other culprits to blame when it comes to undermining monogamous, 
opposite-sex marriage, yet opponents of same-sex marriage have no intention 
to target those who divorce. At most, they may favor the option of covenant 
marriage or other measures that might make it more difficult for a couple to 
divorce. They certainly do not want to eliminate no-fault divorce or prosecute 
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those who are unfaithful to their marital partners. It may be true that the vast 
majority of straight people who oppose same-sex marriage are uncomfortable 
with same-sex relations. But like Scalia did in his dissent in Romer, one could 
argue that those who voted for Amendment 2 were not homophobic.187 Rather, 
they were expressing their genuine moral disapprobation of gays and lesbians 
and same-sex relationships in the midst of a cultural war. In doing so, they 
would be assuming that it is legitimate to morally disapprove of 
homosexuality. However, their doing so may call into question the 
constitutionality of the law that they helped bring into being. As Koppelman 
puts it, “The constitutional status of laws that discriminate against gays . . . is 
uncertain after Romer.”188 That situation results from the lack of clarity 
concerning the kinds of reasons that the state may offer in support of its view 
that sexual orientation can be a relevant difference in treating gays and lesbians 
differently. Windsor makes clear that the state cannot treat married gays and 
lesbians differently with respect to federal marital benefits when such 
differential treatment is rooted in a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular 
group.189 In Windsor, Kennedy did not simply rely on Romer but instead 
extended its rationale in the direction of marital equality. 
In 2015, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the U.S. Supreme Court finally may end 
the controversy over whether the Constitution requires states to allow same-sex 
couples to marry.190 The prospects of a victory for those who have fought for 
marriage equality for gays and lesbians look even better than they did in 
2013.191 As of this writing, only thirteen states refuse to permit a man to marry 
another man or a woman to marry another woman.192 In the aftermath of 
Windsor, the same-sex marriage advocates have prevailed in most of the lower 
courts. The Sixth Circuit decision that the Supreme Court decided to review 
has the dubious distinction of being the only case in the last two years in which 
the other side has had success.193 The rapid change in circumstances makes it 
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much easier for a majority of justices to minimize their worries about backlash 
and make martial equality for gays and lesbians a constitutional reality. 
G. Animus 
In Obergefell, the Court will have to revisit the debate between Kennedy 
and Scalia over how to characterize the reasons that states fall back upon to 
justify treating opposite-sex couples so much more favorably regarding 
marriage. States cannot simply point to the fact that a practice has existed for a 
long time. Recently, Judge Richard Posner took the states of Indiana and 
Wisconsin to task in a same-sex marriage case for selectively interpreting the 
tradition of marriage.194 The doctrine of animus is judicially 
underdeveloped.195 That may change over time as legal scholars explicate its 
meaning; investigate the possible broader precedential impact of cases like 
Romer, Windsor, and maybe Obergefell; say more about how it can be 
identified; and influence the thinking of the legal community. The 
underdeterminacy of the case law with respect to the meaning of animus may 
be a blessing in disguise for those who seek to use it in the future to protect 
other discrete and insular minorities from being disadvantaged by the law. 
What is sincere moral disapproval for Scalia is animus against a sexual 
minority for Kennedy. The description of the state’s interest, then, will 
determine its legitimacy and whether the legislative classification at issue 
passes rational basis. 
For instance, not permitting interracial couples to marry or cohabitate only 
could be rationalized by a false belief of white supremacy.196 These days, it 
would be hard to find a judge who would allow the state to enact legislation 
designed to convey the message that one racial group is superior. A white 
supremacist does not have to hate racial minorities and want them to be 
murdered, even though some white supremacists surely do want this state of 
affairs to come about. While some readers may object to the comparison of 
interracial and same-sex marriage, those who have been denied the right to 
marriage on the basis of their sexual orientation may have been denied that 
right on the basis of a characteristic that is just as arbitrary as race is. Justice 
Kennedy begins his majority opinion in Romer by comparing racial 
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discrimination to discrimination based on sexual orientation.197 This view is 
becoming more prevalent. If more Americans can at least imagine that the 
state’s failures to permit both kinds of marriage—same-sex and plural, 
regardless of its gender composition—are morally and legally equivalent, then 
they also might entertain the possibility that animus underlies laws that do not 
allow same-sex couples to marry. Even under rational basis review, lawmakers 
and voters may not act on such a basis. 
For a judge to decide whether such animus exists in a given case, she must 
not only make a factual judgment about the totality of the circumstances in 
which the law in question was engendered but also make a moral judgment 
about what animus means. Legal reasoning never can be strictly deductive, 
which means that the exercise of constitutional judgment requires both factual 
and normative evaluations, neither of which is likely to prove uncontroversial 
in important constitutional cases. Animus is an interpretive concept, and it is 
safe to assert that it is not synonymous with hatred or a desire to harm others. 
If animus is to be interpreted in this way, it would be an extremely rare law 
that would be tainted in that way. It would require that the court shift the 
burden of proof from the parties challenging the law to the state defending the 
law to show that those who enacted the law had additional, legitimate reasons 
for doing so. In his dissent in Romer, Justice Scalia goes so far as to assert that 
the voters are entitled to be hostile towards gays and lesbians.198 His meaning 
seems to be that they can express their moral disapproval of same-sex sexual 
relations by singling out gays, lesbians, and bisexuals for unfavorable 
treatment. Although the precise meaning of “animus” is disputed, many legal 
scholars and judges believe that a legislative majority may not act on the basis 
of certain reasons, namely those rooted in malice.199 In Windsor, Justice 
Kennedy referred to “discrimination of an unusual character” and later in his 
majority opinion mentions that which is designed to disparage and injure.200 
According to Dale Carpenter, the “[a]nimus doctrine constitutionalizes [the] 
basic precept” that “one should not hate any human being or class of human 
beings.”201 “Hate” is a strong word, and almost all of those who reject 
same-sex marriage would resist the characterization of their continuing 
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opposition to it as having anything to do with hatred. Just because they do not 
see the connection, however, does not mean that it does not exist. When a 
white supremacist insists that he does not hate African-Americans, for 
example, most of us will take what he has said with a large grain of salt. If only 
hatred is synonymous with malice for constitutional purposes, then the 
problem in Equal Protection cases lies less in the inappropriateness of the 
subjective motivation for voting for, say, Amendment 2, Proposition 8, or 
Section 3 of DOMA, and more in the failure to treat the minority group at issue 
fairly. Even Chief Justice Roberts, in his dissent in Windsor, stated that it was 
constitutionally impermissible to “codify malice.”202 
The issue, then, is what such malice amounts to. At some point, when legal 
professionals have to apply the law to real fact patterns and legal scholars have 
to meet deadlines, the process of making fine conceptual distinctions must 
come to an end. Given what is known about the flaws of the legislative 
process, constitutionally, it makes at least some sense to see animus as a 
nonpublic reason: that is, a reason that reasonable persons would not and could 
not share as justification for unequal treatment. According to Bedi, “[T]he 
Equal Protection Clause is best understood . . . as a limit on the kinds of 
reasons government may invoke.”203 Coupled with Lawrence, which 
disqualifies mere moral disapproval as a public reason, and in the absence of 
harm to others, the state is under a constitutional obligation to put forth a better 
rationale for the law then that it reinforces the moral impermissibility of 
same-sex sex acts or relations. If a court is going to uphold the law, then the 
justification that its defenders offer on its behalf cannot involve a moral 
judgment that expresses the view that being straight is better than all 
alternative lifestyles. In other words, animus rules out moral opposition to 
same-sex marriage as a rationale for unequal treatment. That such opposition 
can be traced to a religious source is neither here nor there. In 2015, few of us 
would care about the origins of the religious reasons that a person might have 
for being against interracial marriage, notwithstanding the sincerity of such 
beliefs. The conclusion would be that animus underlies the opposition, which 
is to say that the moral disapproval expressed is inappropriate. After all, that 
sort of relationship is morally unobjectionable. By contrast, if an individual 
were to morally condemn how her neighbor abuses her intimate partner, then 
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his moral approval would be warranted in a manner in which such opposition 
to an interracial couple never could. 
If opposition to same-sex marriage more closely resembles opposition to 
interracial couples, as opposed to the above neighbor’s poor treatment of her 
intimate partner, then the state’s interest is not legitimate. In his dissent in 
Windsor, Justice Scalia takes the same tack that he did in Romer by denying 
that animus explains why members of Congress passed DOMA.204 However, 
according to Koppelman, even “extreme indifference is a constitutional harm 
that has a remedy.”205 Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor lay the foundation for a 
constitutional right to same-sex marriage because it is reasonable to infer from 
them that none of the reasons that lawmakers or voters could use to defend 
only allowing opposite-sex couples to be eligible for marriage licenses are 
adequate. Likewise, one might be equally doubtful of the interests that states 
have in keeping polygamy illegal.206 Although the focus of this Article is not 
decriminalization, the reasons that states usually give for continuing to 
criminalize polygamy also bear on not allowing competent adults to marry 
more than one person at the same time. The most obvious way to ensure that 
states provide the option of plural marriage is to formulate an equal protection 
argument to support the constitutional conclusion that the state cannot favor 
monogamous marriages over plural ones by only licensing the former. 
As noted, to do so would be to show that a state’s only giving marriage 
licenses to couples, opposite or same sex, triggers a heightened standard of 
review. Even if such a law only is subject to rational basis, the state still lacks a 
legitimate interest in privileging monogamous marital relationships. Either 
way, the basic constitutional strategy would be to show that the state’s interests 
in not broadening the definition of marriage are much weaker than individuals’ 
interests in having a wider range of martial options and cannot withstand 
scrutiny. The state is not supposed to use its power to validate heterosexuality. 
Similarly, it is not supposed to dictate which way of living or marriage is most 
conducive to human flourishing. The Equal Protection Clause sets parameters 
for the exercise of political power by not enabling the states to treat different 
groups differently unless they can successfully defend such treatment. The 
traditional “tiers-of-scrutiny” do not give much guidance about when a 
rationale is unsatisfactory.207 Thus, judges have considerable discretion in 
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determining the strength of the state’s interests. This fact helps to explain why 
strict in theory is not always fatal in fact. A public-reasons approach can be 
employed to decide when the state has exceeded its constitutional authority 
when it makes legislative classifications.208 Such an approach is not perfect, of 
course, yet it helps the decisionmaker focus on what is most important for the 
legal analysis, namely the reasons that the state offers as justification for why it 
did what it did. 
The anti-animus principle that emerges from Windsor calls upon judges to 
assess the quality of the state’s reasons for discriminating. Deciding whether a 
particular law is sufficiently motivated by animus, understood as having the 
wrong motive, is bound to be complicated more often than not in the midst of 
so many possible motives. That does not mean that animus is in the eye of the 
beholder. In the context of racial discrimination, for example, nobody still 
believes that Jim Crow laws were not driven by what contemporary Americans 
would call animus. A finding of animus may shift the burden of proof to the 
state to show that it has other, more widely acceptable reasons for treating one 
group differently than another, or it may be fatal to the law in question. This 
sort of analysis appears in the Hollingsworth and Windsor litigation, where the 
judges did not take the state’s asserted interest at face value. Instead, they 
questioned the sincerity of the reasons offered on behalf of laws that 
discriminated against same-sex couples because they provided little, if any, 
support. According to Carpenter, “the flimsiness of these justifications 
reinforces the conclusion that the law was infected by animus.”209 The 
reasoning is something like this: when lawmakers put forth reasons that are so 
bad, they probably are insincere. Their insincerity suggests that they have other 
reasons that they are trying to conceal. They would not conceal them unless 
they were suspect. 
If animus, understood as a lack of sufficiently public reasons for a law, 
explains why all states limit marriage to couples, then states may be 
constitutionally required to make marriage as inclusive as possible. As noted, it 
may be easier to know the difference between moral disapproval in the abstract 
than in actual cases. This is where a public-reasons approach proves its worth 
because it tells the judge to reject reasons that the state advances when those 
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reasons are too sectarian to serve as the basis of a law. As Judge Walker wrote 
in Perry v. Schwarzenegger,  
Whether [the] belief is based on moral disapproval of homosexuality, 
animus towards gays and lesbians or simply a belief that a 
relationship between a man and a woman is inherently better than a 
relationship between two men or two women, this belief is not a 
proper basis on which to legislate.210 
As a result, the judge’s job is at least somewhat easier because he or she can 
strike down a law that is premised upon a conception of the good. The state 
may not take away the option of a plural marriage from plural marriage 
enthusiasts unless it has sufficient public reasons for doing so. This Article has 
elaborated on why those reasons do not exist. Legislators cannot simply cite 
the “fact” that monogamy is superior or that the public believes it to be so any 
more than it can defend not permitting a man to marry another man or a 
woman to marry another woman on the ground that their intimate relationships 
are intrinsically inferior to a heterosexual relationship. After all, they are not, 
and even if it were proved that they were so beyond a shadow of a doubt, the 
state still cannot rely on such a rationale. 
Constitutionally, the issue comes down to who should decide and not 
whether any decision to marry is wise. The lives of plural marriage enthusiasts 
are just as important as those of who prefer monogamy. Unnecessary 
numerical restrictions make it harder for them to have kind of life that for them 
is most fulfilling. While to some supporters of same-sex marriage, 
discrimination against such enthusiasts may seem comparatively trivial, that 
belief does not change the fact that the state does not have to treat polygamists 
and polyamorists unequally when it comes to marriage. At the end of the day, 
the constitutionality of any restriction on whom one may marry is a function of 
the quality of the reasons that the state puts forth.211 The more heightened the 
standard of review, the better those reasons have to be. When they turn out to 
be unsatisfactory, a court is supposed to find the law, which infringes on a 
fundamental right or treats a suspect class unequally, to be unconstitutional. 
Those who care about treating everyone fairly must be aware of how easy it is 
to not notice that a minority group has been invidiously discriminated against. 
Because the distinction between same-sex and plural marriage is a distinction 
without a constitutional difference, they merit the same legal treatment. 
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VI. CONSEQUENCES 
Those who hope real marital freedom and equality will come into being 
someday in this country may not witness anything close to such a change in 
their lifetimes. Radical constitutional positions do not gain adherents 
overnight. The social environment in which such change could take place has 
to be conducive to elite and especially public opinion shifting away from a 
deeply ingrained belief that monogamy is superior. With rare exceptions, 
courts tend to acknowledge the soundness of constitutional arguments only 
when the timing is right.212 Unfortunately, such arguments only receive the 
attention that they deserve in an atmosphere where the public is more tolerant 
of difference. At some point, the willingness of more and more Americans not 
to summarily dismiss the very idea of marital multiplicity may start a discourse 
about the best meaning of marital equality. Their willingness may prompt them 
to consider that a plural marriage might work better for some people in some 
circumstances and perhaps conclude, as this Article has tried to show, that the 
Constitution requires states to allow polygamists and polyamorists to marry. A 
constitutional argument can be sound, yet it also must be recognized as such by 
the legal community prior to its being able to influence the outcome of real 
cases. The constitutional litigation regarding same-sex marriage nicely 
illustrates this point.213 
As of this writing, though, no state has decriminalized polygamy and no 
state is on the verge of doing so.214 DOMA not only discriminates against 
same-sex couples but also against all polygamous unions.215 The constitutional 
conclusion that this Article argues for—that states that only legally recognize 
two-person marital unions are acting unconstitutionally—probably strikes a 
considerable number of readers as a product of the worst kind of utopian 
theorizing. Those who have that reaction should keep in mind that the 
improbability of any sort of legal recognition of marital multiplicity in the 
foreseeable future does not imply that the idea lacks constitutional merit or that 
its time will never come. In the late eighteenth century, the abolition of slavery 
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and the enfranchisement of women were unrealistic. Above all, even when the 
reader continues to be skeptical, which is understandable, this Article assumes 
that he or she can conceptualize a possible world where states do not disrespect 
plural marriage enthusiasts. The scholarly treatment of many interesting and 
important theoretical constitutional questions would become sidetracked if 
scholars always were caught up in practical questions about feasibility. For 
example, a number of prominent legal scholars, especially those on the left 
these days, have made the case for limiting the role of the U.S. Supreme Court 
or eliminating judicial review.216 In 2015, neither change to the status quo is 
terribly realistic in the sense that Americans can be expected to embrace it. If 
anything, judicial review probably will become even more entrenched given 
the current dysfunction of the federal government and judicial trends in other 
developed democracies. In short, one should not respond to the question of 
whether the practice of judicial review by federal courts makes good normative 
sense only by trying to calculate the probability of the change and how such a 
proposal could be institutionalized.217 
Likewise, practical questions never should dominate the constitutional 
discussion of plural marriage to the point where nobody cares about the 
soundness of the arguments. This is neither the time nor the place to defend 
ideal theory and its role in either political or constitutional thought. But, this 
Article presupposes the utility of a scholarly division of labor in which 
assessing the soundness of a constitutional argument cannot be equated with 
the likelihood of its being implemented within the next few decades. American 
constitutional history indicates that at least some resistance to any 
more-than-trivial change in constitutional meaning is inevitable. The institution 
of marriage will continue to evolve, and those who reject those changes will 
insist that the future is dark. There was a time when almost all Americans 
would not have worried about a conception of marriage that by contemporary 
standards would be not only racist but also misogynistic. At the founding, most 
of them probably would not have viewed an even lower age of consent for 
marriage or for sexual relations as problematic. After the Civil War, surely 
Americans would not have fathomed that our Constitution could force states to 
permit members of the same gender to marry each other.218 
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It should be more difficult, then, to summarily dismiss any proposed reform 
due to its being alleged to be too radical or ridiculously utopian. When the law 
is unsettled and the timing is optimal, legal professionals can put together 
arguments that justify the outcome they desire. In constitutional controversies, 
public opinion can shift rapidly.219 American constitutional experience 
demonstrates that divining our future is fraught with difficulties. Some 
constitutional understandings, which the legal community used to consider 
far-fetched, are now widely accepted.220 As noted, twenty years ago, the view 
that same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marry would not have been 
taken seriously.221 Recent political rhetoric about the family has oversimplified 
its complicated history.222 Marriage never has and never will have a universal 
meaning. In some places and at some times, it has reinforced notions of racial, 
gender, and religious supremacy.223 One of the worst mistakes that anyone can 
make, when it comes to arguing for a particular normative view of what 
marriage should be, is to conceal its checkered past. In fact, the idea of 
(monogamous) same-sex marriage is more unprecedented than polygyny in 
human history.224 
The vast majority of Americans reject plural marriage.225 As a result, those 
who want states to diversify marriage must persuade ordinary Americans, their 
elected representatives, and judges to view plural marriage as morally 
permissible under certain conditions so that polygamists and polyamorists are 
treated equally. The truth is that understanding and compassion do not come to 
most of us easily. At present, the chances that advocates of same-sex marriage 
will align themselves with those who support the legal recognition of plural 
marriage are small. Any conversation about the merits of plural marriage may 
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be premature when the American public still is divided over same-sex 
marriage.226 In 2013, the United States Supreme Court failed to take advantage 
of two opportunities to recognize a constitutional right to same-sex marriage 
(or its equivalent on equal protection grounds).227 However, recently, the Court 
granted certiorari in such a case.228 So far, no state has recognized any sort of 
plural marriage.229 Nor will any legislature or court do so in the foreseeable 
future. In 2007, the Court declined to hear such a case.230 At most, the 
decriminalization of polygamy in some states may be off in the distance. The 
extension of the constitutional right of marriage beyond couples appears to be 
something that most Americans are not ready for. 
It is possible that this situation will not remain stagnant as time passes, 
particularly when those who are unsympathetic to marital multiplicity resist the 
temptation to reduce it to the most egregious sorts of polygyny to score 
rhetorical points. The American public might not be so adamantly opposed to 
plural marriage if it were better informed about its variations. There was a time 
in our not-so-distant past when nearly all Americans would have drawn upon 
the most pernicious stereotypes to deny treating gays and lesbians fairly. 
Television programs like TLC’s Sister Wives and HBO’s Big Love can 
continue to humanize polygynists and in doing so, make the unfamiliar more 
familiar. American attitudes toward sexuality and marriage have evolved, and 
it is no longer as easy as it once was for Americans to know “normal” when 
they see it. Alternatives lifestyles are a more visible phenomenon than they 
used to be, and their increased visibility may induce more Americans to be less 
dogmatic about the morality and constitutionality of numerical restrictions. For 
the most part, though, Americans do not discuss plural marriage fairly, as if the 
topic was not worthy of anyone’s time. It may be wishful thinking to expect 
less hostility and more charity in the near future, but anti-plural-marriage 
views may become less prominent as more people become more curious about 
what they are really like and begin to see that discrimination against plural 
marriage enthusiasts is akin or at least similar to discriminating against gays, 
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lesbians, and other sexual minorities. The time may come when such marital 
discrimination is no longer socially acceptable as more Americans come to 
realize that their friends, coworkers, and neighbors want nonmonogamous 
marital arrangements or want to experiment with them. Some polygamists 
already are coming out of the closet, despite the legal risks of doing so. It is 
time for our society to stop marginalizing them and start treating them as 
equals. 
CONCLUSION 
This purpose of this Article has been not only to survey the constitutional 
landscape in search of rationales in support of a right to plural marriage or its 
equivalent on equal protection grounds. It also takes a normative position by 
embracing marital diversity and contending that as long as the state remains in 
the marriage business, it must legally recognize any intimate relationship that 
competent, consenting adults want to form, regardless of its number, gender 
composition, or interpersonal dynamics, provided that the behaviors do not 
violate other valid laws. This conclusion finds considerable constitutional 
support in the meanings of substantive due process, understood as the value of 
martial choice, and equal protection, understood as identical legal treatment in 
the absence of sufficient justification for the contrary. When all is said and 
done, the state’s interests in denying marital choice are weak. From the 
standpoint of the Constitution, the meaning of marriage ought to lie in the eye 
of the beholder. The state should not be trying to save competent adults from 
what may turn out to be poor marital choices when a substantial majority of 
states allow couples to marry for just about any personal reason that they 
happen to have. Additionally, some states let minors marry with parental 
consent.231 When someone is being physically abused, then without question, 
the state can intervene. But there is a world of constitutional difference 
between preventing such harm and infringing upon the personal choice only of 
plural marriage enthusiasts in the name of an ideal of internal equality that 
many couples do not live up to or even care about. Like everyone else, such 
enthusiasts have lives to lead. Sooner rather than later, Americans must ask 
themselves whether such unequal treatment is constitutionally tolerable in a 
society that is supposed to respect the freedom and equality of all of its 
members. 
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As this Article explains, the understandable preoccupation with same-sex 
marriage in the midst of ongoing legal discrimination against gays and lesbians 
in many states should not come at the expense of excluding a wide variety of 
multi-person intimate relationships, opposite or same-sex. It should not matter 
that polygamists and polyamorists do not yet have the resources to advance 
their agenda or that their being nonmonogamous may often not be as central to 
their self-understanding as sexual orientation is for most gays and lesbians in a 
society that continues to make so much of their difference. At this moment, the 
numbers are neither here nor there. The fate of legal recognition of plural 
marriage should not turn on whether it enjoys as much popular support as 
same-sex marriage. The cause of marriage equality, then, could be less 
sectarian and more about ending all forms of marital discrimination. 
Americans inhabit a place in which polygamous relationships exist, and 
that state of affairs is not going to change in the near future. In attempting to 
discern whether the current legal definition in all states is underinclusive and 
therefore both morally unenlightened and constitutionally objectionable, this 
Article endeavors to start a conversation that is long overdue. After all, 
everyone has the right to be treated fairly under the Constitution, even when 
they have different conceptions about what kind of intimacy is most important 
to them. The voters or their elected representatives often are not equipped to 
make such judgments for such discrete and insular minorities. Indeed, that 
intolerant attitude is partially responsible for the misery that many minorities 
experience because of their difference. In a pluralistic society, considerable 
variance in ways of life is to be expected. The lives of polygamists and 
polyamorists not only count but count equally. As a result, they must be 
allowed to marry everyone who wants to marry them unless a marriage 
becomes so large that it is administratively unmanageable. The point is not that 
multi-partner relationships are for everyone or even for most adults. 
Polyamorists are vocal about how challenging they tend to be. Rather, it is that 
such a decision is best left to the individuals most directly affected by how 
their intimate lives are structured. 
Someday, there may be a U.S. Supreme Court decision for plural marriage 
enthusiasts that would do for them what Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor are 
doing to improve the lives of gays and lesbians in this country. While courts do 
not initiate invidious discrimination, they can constitutionalize it by permitting 
it. Eventually, some lawmakers and judges may be more critical of the 
rationale for continuing to criminalize the mere act of being “married” to more 
than one adult simultaneously and more willing to acknowledge that 
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regulation, as opposed to prohibition, is not only fair but more humane and 
effective at addressing crimes associated with certain polygynous 
arrangements. As it stands, women in illegal, polygynous relationships are 
vulnerable in multiple ways. However, a change in thinking may pave the way 
for evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the case against the 
constitutional right to plural marriage more objectively. As circumstances 
change, what was at one point an almost inconceivable constitutional view 
may become more plausible. 
When it comes to marriage, then, the state does not have to define marriage 
in a needlessly narrow way that is predicated on the dubious claims that some 
kinds of marriages are intrinsically superior and produce better overall 
consequences. The decision not to marry, to marry only one person, or to 
marry multiple persons simultaneously can be left to individuals who may have 
very different perspectives on the meaning of marriage, how it should be 
configured, its dynamics, and its place in their lives. The quality of any 
personal relationship, including marriage, is bound to be a product of its 
particulars. All of the well-known objections made against multi-person 
intimate relationships can be made against same- or opposite-sex monogamy 
as well, resulting in an indefensible double standard. Sadly, many two-person 
intimate relationships are dysfunctional, and a closer, more brutally honest 
look at them should not inspire confidence in their superiority. Americans do 
not have to internalize this double standard, family law does not have to 
incorporate it, lawmakers do not have to put up with it, and judges do not have 
to put their imprimatur on it. 
